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INTRODUCTION
Defenders of sex and race inequality often contend that women
and people of color are better off with fewer rights and opportunities.
This claim straddles substantive debates that are rarely considered
together, linking such seemingly disparate disputes as the struggles
over race-based affirmative action, antiabortion laws, and marital rape
exemptions.  The argument posits that women and people of color
attempting to secure expanded rights and opportunities do not under-
stand their own best interests and do not realize that they benefit from
* Julius E. Davis Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School.  B.A. 1994,
J.D. 1997, Yale University.  I would like to thank Bruce Ackerman, Richard Banks,
Susanna Blumenthal, Allan Erbsen, Heather Gerken, Daniel Markovits, Ruth Okediji,
Reva Siegel, Robin West, and the participants in faculty workshops at Yale Law School,
Stanford Law School, Georgetown University Law Center, and the University of
Minnesota Law School. © 2009, Jill Elaine Hasday.
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limits on their prerogatives and choices.  Indeed, proponents of this
argument insist that restricting the rights and opportunities available
to women and people of color helps everyone:  the people mis-
guidedly seeking more rights and opportunities, the people opposing
those claims, and society as a whole.  The beguiling conclusion is that
the law need not decide between conflicting demands because all par-
ties share aligned interests.  I call this effort to assert social solidarity
in the face of social conflict the “mutual benefits” argument.
This Article reveals and analyzes the mutual benefits argument to
make three points.  First, judges, legislators, and commentators
defending contemporary laws and policies frequently claim that
restricting rights and opportunities protects women and people of
color.  The claims appear across a range of contexts, but their common
structure has remained hidden from view and critical scrutiny.
Second, modern mutual benefits discourse has deep historical roots in
widely repudiated forms of discrimination, including slavery, racial
segregation, and women’s legalized inequality.  Third, the historical
deployment of mutual benefits arguments to defend pernicious dis-
crimination creates reason for caution in considering contemporary
mutual benefits claims that are now accepted quickly with little evi-
dence, investigation, or debate.  Mutual benefits discourse historically
operated to rationalize and reinforce discriminatory practices that the
nation has since disavowed.  Modern mutual benefits arguments must
be evaluated carefully or they risk shielding subordination once again.
Parts I and II examine contemporary mutual benefits discourse.
Part I explores how arguments contending that restrictions on
women’s legal rights promote women’s welfare have flourished in the
modern era, building on the assumption that women’s true interests
and ultimate obligations center on marriage and family life.  At least
twenty-four states, for instance, retain some form of a marital rape
exemption.  These states criminalize fewer offenses if committed
within marriage, punish more leniently the marital rape they do recog-
nize, and/or impose additional procedural barriers to marital rape
prosecutions.1  Legislators, courts, and commentators have explained
since the last quarter of the twentieth century that granting wives an
unhindered right to pursue marital rape charges would allow women
to shatter their marital harmony, destroy their marital privacy, and
make marital reconciliation much more difficult.  This argument main-
tains that both husbands and wives are better off if the law limits the
criminality of marital rape, although the benefits to men and women
differ.  Marital rape exemptions protect husbands from prosecution
1 See infra notes 17–19 and accompanying text.
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and wives from damage to their marital relationship assertedly more
harmful to them than the marital rape itself.2
Similar arguments that limiting women’s rights serves women’s
best interests have increasingly come to shape antiabortion legislation
and the Supreme Court’s abortion jurisprudence. Roe v. Wade
(1973)3 stressed the need to mediate between competing rights and
interests:  a woman’s right to have an abortion versus a state’s interest
in protecting women’s health and the potential life of the fetus.  Since
Roe, however, the antiabortion movement has recognized in increas-
ingly explicit terms that many Americans are unwilling to criminalize
abortion if doing so will harm women.  The movement and its govern-
ment allies have turned more and more to the language of aligned
interests rather than competing rights, insisting that both women
seeking abortions and people opposed to abortion are better off if the
law restricts or prohibits abortion.  This argument contends that
antiabortion laws protect women from the psychological harm that
abortion would inflict upon them and the regret they would and
should experience after abortion.  The argument visibly influenced the
Court’s plurality opinion in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey (1992),4 which upheld mandatory waiting
periods before abortion and “informed consent” laws designed to per-
suade women not to have abortions.  The Court explicitly endorsed
the assumption of regret in Gonzales v. Carhart (2007)5 with little dis-
cussion or explanation. Carhart upheld the federal prohibition of an
abortion procedure—even where that procedure is the safest method
of abortion—on the premise that some women will, and perhaps all
women should, come to regret having abortions.6
Part II considers modern mutual benefits discourse in the racial
context.  Arguments that whites and people of color have aligned
interests in defeating civil rights initiatives have become increasingly
prominent in recent years.  For example, the Supreme Court’s initial
decisions restricting race-based government affirmative action pro-
grams and early academic criticism emphasized the conflicting inter-
ests of whites and people of color, and the burdens that affirmative
action imposed on whites.  But the Court and academic critics
abruptly switched focus within just a few years and a few opinions.
More recent opposition to affirmative action has stressed that affirma-
tive action policies must be severely restricted in scope and duration
2 See infra Part I.A.
3 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
4 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
5 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
6 See infra Part I.B.
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because otherwise these policies will harm people of color.  This
account contends that legal decisionmakers need not choose between
competing sides because the people participating in affirmative action
programs and the people opposed to those programs have shared
interests.  People of every race and with every view on affirmative
action all purportedly benefit in their own way if affirmative action is
first limited and then eliminated.7
Parts III and IV uncover the genealogy of mutual benefits claims,
analyzing historical manifestations of mutual benefits discourse.  The
mutual benefits argument is not a recent innovation devised to
respond to the demands of the contemporary civil rights era.8  It is a
long established claim that defenders of unequal status relations have
repeatedly deployed, relying on the argument’s familiarity to bolster
its plausibility.  The contention that more rights would harm the rights
holders appeared prominently in defenses of slavery,9 racial segrega-
tion,10 married women’s subordination to their husbands at common
law,11 and legislation restricting women’s rights to negotiate about
market work.12  Mutual benefits arguments for sex and race inequality
especially proliferated in eras, like our own, when reform movements
7 See infra Part II.
8 For analyses of how status regimes can maintain themselves in times of contestation
by rearticulating their justifications in new language that resonates with contemporaries,
see William N. Eskridge, Jr, Some Effects of Identity-Based Social Movements on Constitu-
tional Law in the Twentieth Century, 100 MICH. L. REV. 2062, 2071 (2002) (“[Identity-based
social movements] inevitably triggered a politics of preservation.  There, a countermove-
ment would reassert traditional normative and legal baselines and the inferiority of the
minority group.  Such a politics might ease up if the minority gained acceptance within the
nation’s social and political pluralist system; although extremists would still insist on tradi-
tional baselines and the minority’s inferiority, moderates in the countermovement would
concede toleration of the minority, but with social and legally protected space for tradi-
tional ingroup members to retain their dominance.” (emphasis omitted)); Reva B. Siegel,
“The Rule of Love”:  Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117, 2119
(1996) (“When the legitimacy of a status regime is successfully contested, lawmakers and
jurists will both cede and defend status privileges—gradually relinquishing the original
rules and justificatory rhetoric of the contested regime and finding new rules and reasons
to protect such status privileges as they choose to defend.  Thus, civil rights reform can
breathe new life into a body of status law, by pressuring legal elites to translate it into a
more contemporary, and less controversial, social idiom.”); Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111
YALE L.J. 769, 775, 778 (2002) (“I retell the history of the gay rights movement as a history
of the increasingly attenuated assimilationist demands placed on gays by mainstream
society, in both nonlegal and legal contexts.  I show that as the gay rights movement has
become stronger, the assimilationist demands made on gays have become weaker, shifting
in emphasis from conversion, to passing, to covering. . . . Any real engagement with gay
history, however, shows that in some instances, the shift from conversion to passing or
covering can be experienced by gays as no shift at all.”).
9 See infra Part IV.A.
10 See infra Part IV.B.
11 See infra Part III.A.
12 See infra Part III.B.
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were vigorously working to improve the status of women and people
of color.  The reform efforts presumably undermined claims that the
law should favor men over women, or whites over people of color.13
Historical mutual benefits arguments were nominally committed to
helping women and people of color.  But they consistently and explic-
itly assumed that women and people of color were unusually poor
decisionmakers unable to assess their own interests, that women’s true
concerns were confined to domesticity, and that people of color were
better off the less they challenged and disturbed white people and
white-dominated institutions.  Connections between the defenses of
slavery, segregation, and women’s legal inequality have rarely been
noticed.  Highlighting them uncovers important precursors to modern
civil rights discourse.
Part V argues that the extensive use of mutual benefits claims to
support now-rejected forms of discrimination should affect how we
assess modern mutual benefits arguments.  The fact that historical ver-
sions of the mutual benefits claim are no longer convincing does not
necessarily mean that current or future expressions of the claim
cannot be appropriate.  Mutual benefits arguments may sometimes be
reasonable and cogent.  But the role that mutual benefits arguments
played in defending pernicious forms of inequality creates grounds for
caution in considering contemporary assertions that women and
people of color are better off with limited rights and opportunities.
Courts, legislators, and commentators may be predisposed to endorse
these assertions quickly with little support, deliberation, or debate
because the assertions resonate with a long history of mutual benefits
arguments and invoke shared cultural memories of prior mutual bene-
fits claims.  The antecedent life of mutual benefits discourse can give
13 Legal decisionmakers and advocates have also relied on mutual benefits discourse to
defend limits on gay people’s rights and opportunities.  For instance, military and political
leaders advanced mutual benefits claims in successfully rebuffing efforts in the 1990s to
permit openly gay people to serve in the military.  These leaders argued, suggested, or
implied that excluding openly gay people from military service left gay people better off by
protecting them from the violence that heterosexual soldiers would otherwise inflict upon
them. See Policy Concerning Homosexuality in the Armed Forces:  Hearings Before the S.
Comm. on Armed Servs., 103d Cong. 596 (1994) (statement of General H. Norman
Schwarzkopf, USA (Ret.)); id. at 602, 615 (statement of Colonel Frederick C. Peck,
USMC); id. at 643 (statement of Senator John Warner); Policy Implications of Lifting the
Ban on Homosexuals in the Military:  Hearings Before the H. Comm. on Armed Servs.,
103d Cong. 170–71 (1993) (statement of Master Chief Petty Officer Chuck Jackson, USN
(Ret.), Non-Commissioned Officers Association); id. at 171–73 (statement of Colonel John
Ripley, USMC, Retired, The Retired Officers Association).  The history of mutual benefits
discourse for sex and race inequality suggests that mutual benefits arguments supporting
restrictions on gay people’s rights and opportunities will become more prominent over
time as the accelerating success of the gay rights movement undermines claims that the law
should disfavor homosexuals and privilege heterosexuals.
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modern mutual benefits arguments an inordinate power to persuade
that makes explanation and elaboration seem unnecessary.  Yet
mutual benefits arguments were historically employed to support
practices that are now repudiated, and they drew on ways of thinking
about women and people of color that are now suspect.  Whatever
one’s views on the merits of legal paternalism as a general matter,14
there is reason to be cautious about contentions that all parties benefit
when the law denies rights and opportunities to women and people of
color.
Part V concludes by seeking to stimulate greater conversation
about mutual benefits claims that are often accepted too easily.  I use
the reasons why historical mutual benefits arguments are uncon-
vincing to formulate four practical criteria that judges, legislators, and
commentators should apply in evaluating contemporary mutual bene-
fits discourse.  These criteria ask whether advocates asserting that
rights and opportunities will injure women or people of color are con-
sistent in their arguments, whether they present evidence of harm,
whether they rely on narrow assumptions about how women or
people of color should behave, and whether they engage with counter-
arguments and opposing viewpoints.  I employ these criteria to assess
several modern mutual benefits arguments.
Contemporary claims that women or people of color benefit from
limited rights and opportunities have many of the same weaknesses as
their historical precursors.  First, judges, legislators, and commenta-
tors have been very selective in contending that people seeking rights
and opportunities can be safely ignored because they fundamentally
misunderstand their own interests.  The law does not usually assume
that people are radically mistaken about how to improve their lives
and need to be protected from themselves.  But claims that women or
people of color will be worse off with more rights and choices are
common.  Second, the evidence that rights and opportunities harm
women or people of color is sometimes questionably reliable, and
sometimes simply nonexistent.  Third, mutual benefits claims fre-
quently depend on and enforce rigid, historically embedded assump-
tions about how women and people of color should think, act, and
live.  Modern mutual benefits arguments, like their historical prede-
cessors, typically take for granted that women should orient their lives
toward domesticity instead of male-dominated spheres such as the
14 I take no position on the merits of legal paternalism as a general matter.  In fact, I
doubt whether legal paternalism can be evaluated in categorical terms rather than in par-
ticular contexts.  To that end, this Article examines and critiques a specific strain of pater-
nalist argument, which claims that women and people of color are better off with limited
rights and opportunities.
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market.  Similarly, contemporary mutual benefits arguments track his-
torical patterns in presuming that people of color are better off the
more they accommodate and the less they demand from white society.
Finally, modern arguments about mutual benefits to women and men,
or to people of color and whites, often avoid acknowledging any pos-
sible costs associated with restricting the rights and opportunities open
to women and people of color.15
History richly documents how mutual benefits claims have long
served to rationalize and perpetuate legal hierarchies based on sex
and race.  This history also suggests criteria that legal authorities and
advocates should employ in evaluating modern manifestations of
mutual benefits discourse that are now accepted too readily.
Applying these criteria can help assess arguments that risk reinforcing
some of the nation’s most entrenched and intransigent forms of status
inequality.
I
MODERN MUTUAL BENEFITS ARGUMENTS FOR LIMITING
WOMEN’S RIGHTS
Lawmakers, jurists, and advocates frequently contend that limits
on women’s legal rights advance the shared interests of women and
men by preventing women from making poor choices contrary to their
own best interests and their appropriate domestic roles.  This Part
explores two contemporary examples of mutual benefits discourse
spanning the last quarter of the twentieth century to the present day.
The first considers how legislators, courts, and commentators
employed mutual benefits arguments to explain, support, and defend
marital rape exemptions in response to the reform initiatives of the
modern feminist movement at the end of the twentieth century.  The
second considers how legislators, courts, and commentators have used
mutual benefits arguments to counter abortion rights efforts, and
explain, support, and defend antiabortion laws, in the late twentieth
and early twenty-first centuries.
A. Marital Rape Exemptions
At common law, a husband was absolutely exempt from prosecu-
tion for raping his wife.  Courts and treatises throughout the nine-
teenth century routinely endorsed the marital rape exemption.  They
acknowledged that unwanted sex harmed wives.  But they reasoned
that protecting husbands from liability for marital rape fit smoothly
15 See infra Part V.
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within the rest of the common law, which legally subordinated wives
to their husbands and stripped married women of the right to make
many enforceable decisions.16
Although historical arguments for the marital rape exemption no
longer sound convincing, at least twenty-four states retain some form
of an exemption.  These states criminalize a narrower range of
offenses if committed within marriage,17 subject the marital rape they
recognize to less severe sanctions,18 and/or create special procedural
obstacles to marital rape prosecutions.19
Defending contemporary marital rape exemptions as consistent
with women’s interests might seem nearly impossible.  Modern
exemptions are written in facially sex-neutral language regulating one
“spouse’s” rape of the other.20  But all available evidence indicates
that husbands are almost always the perpetrators of marital rape and
wives the victims.21  Moreover, the best available empirical studies
report that marital rape is both widespread22 and extremely damaging,
16 See Jill Elaine Hasday, Contest and Consent:  A Legal History of Marital Rape, 88
CAL. L. REV. 1373, 1392–406, 1464–74, 1504 (2000).
17 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.432 (2008); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1407(D)
(Supp. 2008); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 261–262 (West 2008); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 53a-
65(2)–(3), 53a-70b(b) (West 2007); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-6107 (2004); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 709.4(1)–(2) (West 2003); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3517(a) (2007); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 510.035 (LexisNexis 2008); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:93.5 (2004); MD. CODE ANN.,
CRIM. LAW § 3-318 (LexisNexis Supp. 2008); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.520l (West
2004); MINN. STAT. § 609.349 (2008); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-99 (2006); NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 200.373 (LexisNexis 2006); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 632-A:2 (LexisNexis Supp.
2008); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2907.01(L), 2907.02 (LexisNexis Supp. 2009); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1111 (West Supp. 2009); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 11-37-1(9), 11-37-2 (2002);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-658 (2003); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 22-22-7.2, 22-22-7.4 (2006);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 9A.44.010(3), 9A.44.050, 9A.44.060, 9A.44.100 (West 2009);
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-8B-1(6) (LexisNexis Supp. 2008); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-307(a)
(2009).
18 See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-61(C), 18.2-67.1(C), 18.2-67.2(C) (2009) (permit-
ting court, if victim and state prosecutor agree, to place marital rapist “on probation
pending completion of counseling or therapy” and providing that once counseling or
therapy is completed, “court may discharge the defendant and dismiss the proceedings
against him if, after consideration of the views of the complaining witness and such other
evidence as may be relevant, the court finds such action will promote maintenance of the
family unit and be in the best interest of the complaining witness”).
19 See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-658 (thirty-day reporting requirement).
20 See statutes cited supra notes 17–19.
21 See Hasday, supra note 16, at 1494–96 & nn.444–46.
22 See DAVID FINKELHOR & KERSTI YLLO, LICENSE TO RAPE:  SEXUAL ABUSE OF
WIVES 6–7 (1985) (“Ten percent of the married or previously married women in our sample
[‘of 323 Boston-area women’] said that their husbands had ‘used physical force or threat to
try to have sex with them.’”); DIANA E.H. RUSSELL, RAPE IN MARRIAGE 1–2 (rev. ed.
1990) (“The study I undertook . . . is the only study of wife rape in the United States to be
based on interviews with a random sample of women. Fourteen percent (14%) of the 930
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frequently causing even more trauma than rape outside of marriage.23
Modern feminists, like their nineteenth-century predecessors,24 have
repeatedly condemned marital rape exemptions as central to women’s
legal subordination.25
However, many legal actors evince a powerful tendency to under-
stand limits on women’s rights as advancing the shared interests of
women and men, often by preserving women’s roles within marriage
and constraining women’s independent decisionmaking.  The two
most prominent arguments that courts, legislators, and commentators
have put forward since the last quarter of the twentieth century to
defend marital rape exemptions against the modern feminist move-
ment’s calls for reform are that the exemptions protect marital privacy
and promote marital reconciliation.  These arguments do not explain
why the benefits that marital rape exemptions bestow on husbands, or
on society at large, justify the harms that limited remediation for mar-
ital rape inflicts on wives.  Indeed, the arguments do not mention the
possibility that marital rape or marital rape exemptions might cause
women any injury.  Instead, exemption supporters have contended
that marital rape exemptions further the mutual interests of husbands
and wives by keeping women within intact marriages, suggested that if
women were to seek prosecutions of their husbands for marital rape
they would rue the consequences, and concluded that the appropriate
legal solution is to deny wives the right to pursue such charges.
The claim that marital rape exemptions preserve marital privacy
treats marital rape prosecutions as if they imposed parallel risks and
inflicted parallel injuries on husbands and wives, violating the privacy
of each.  Exemption defenders invoke the image of the state invading
and desecrating the intimacy of marital bedrooms, to the shared detri-
ment of both spouses.  For example, a California state senator and
women interviewed who had ever been married had been raped by a husband or ex-
husband.”).
23 See, e.g., RAQUEL KENNEDY BERGEN, WIFE RAPE:  UNDERSTANDING THE
RESPONSE OF SURVIVORS AND SERVICE PROVIDERS 59–61 (1996); FINKELHOR & YLLO,
supra note 22, at 117–38; RUSSELL, supra note 22, at 190–205; David Finkelhor & Kersti
Yllo, Rape in Marriage:  A Sociological View, in THE DARK SIDE OF FAMILIES:  CURRENT
FAMILY VIOLENCE RESEARCH 119, 126–27 (David Finkelhor et al. eds., 1983); Patricia
Mahoney, High Rape Chronicity and Low Rates of Help-Seeking Among Wife Rape Survi-
vors in a Nonclinical Sample:  Implications for Research and Practice, 5 VIOLENCE
AGAINST WOMEN 993, 993–94 (1999); Mark A. Whatley, For Better or Worse:  The Case of
Marital Rape, 8 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 29, 33–34 (1993).
24 See Hasday, supra note 16, at 1413–42.
25 See, e.g., Robin West, Equality Theory, Marital Rape, and the Promise of the Four-
teenth Amendment, 42 FLA. L. REV. 45, 45–46 (1990); Note, To Have and To Hold:  The
Marital Rape Exemption and the Fourteenth Amendment, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1255, 1255
(1986).
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former Los Angeles police chief insisted that criminalizing marital
rape means that “‘Big Brother [has] intruded himself into the bed-
room, piercing the sanctity of marriage.’”26  A Kentucky state repre-
sentative declared that laws penalizing marital rape “‘are going into
people’s bedrooms, and that’s overstepping our bounds.’”27  A
Pennsylvania court interpreted a legislative modification of the state’s
marital rape exemption narrowly in order to prevent “courts and
juries” from peering “into the privacy of the marital bedroom for the
purpose of supervising the manner in which marital relationships are
consummated.”28
Arguments that marital rape exemptions protect marital privacy
stress a husband and wife’s joint interest in their shared relationship,
rather than considering how the interests of a wife seeking prosecu-
tion for marital rape and a husband seeking to avoid such prosecution
might diverge.  A Florida state representative reported that a marital
rape exemption keeps the state from “invading the sanctity and the
intimacy of a husband and wife sexual relationship.”29  A Colorado
state representative reasoned that allowing marital rape prosecutions
would “‘take[ ] another chink out of the sanctity of marriage. . . .
There are some areas the state just doesn’t belong in. . . . These are
personal things.’”30  The Model Penal Code, which endorses an abso-
lute marital rape exemption,31 observes that the exemption “avoids
[an] unwarranted intrusion of the penal law into the life of the
26 Kathleen Grubb, Senate OKs Tougher Law on Spousal Rape, DAILY NEWS (San
Fernando Valley), Aug. 15, 1992, at News–5 (quoting California State Senator Ed Davis).
27 Chad Carlton, Sponsor:  Marital Rape Bill Could Win OK This Session, LEXINGTON
HERALD-LEADER, Feb. 19, 1990, at A1 (quoting Kentucky State Representative June
Lyne); see also Chuck Ervin, Senate Approves Measure on Spousal Rape:  Bill Would Make
It Easier To File Charge Against a Husband, TULSA WORLD, Apr. 7, 1993, at A13 (“Sen.
Don Rubottom, R-Tulsa, said the proposal was an unwarr[a]nted intrusion by government.
In such cases, the alleged victim and the alleged perpetrator share the same bed, he said.
‘Don’t vote for this as an act of cowardice or to be politically correct,’ he urged.”).
28 Commonwealth v. Mlinarich, 498 A.2d 395, 403 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985).
29 Florida House of Representatives, Floor Debate (May 29, 1980) (statement of Rep-
resentative Tom Bush) (on file with author and the New York University Law Review;
State Archives of Florida); see also id. (“[T]he Bible doesn’t give the state permission any-
where in that book, for the state to be in your bedroom and that’s exactly what this bill has
gone to.  It’s meddling in your bedroom, the state of Florida as an entity deciding what you
can do and what you can’t do. . . . [W]e don’t need to go to meddlin’ in the marriage
bedroom.”) (statement of Representative John Mica).
30 Natalie Phillips, Marital-Rape Bill Clears House; Tebedo Votes ‘No,’ COLO. SPRINGS
GAZETTE TELEGRAPH, Jan. 27, 1988, at B1 (quoting Colorado State Representative Mary
Anne Tebedo).
31 See MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 213.1, at 274–75 (Official Draft and
Revised Comments 1980).
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family.”32  These accounts posit that marital intimacy can survive mar-
ital rape, but not marital rape prosecutions.  Exemption supporters
insist that marital rape exemptions serve the aligned interests of wives
and husbands by protecting marriages from outside scrutiny.
The second prominent defense of marital rape exemptions that
legal authorities and advocates deployed in response to modern femi-
nist reform efforts contends that such exemptions promote marital
reconciliation.  This claim acknowledges that wives might want to seek
prosecution for marital rape, but identifies that decision as a massive
mistake.  The argument maintains that pursuing marital rape charges
would halt a process of private reconciliation that would leave both
husbands and wives better off than either would be if marital rape
were fully criminalized.  One commentator, an assistant district
attorney in New York,33 explained that allowing marital rape prosecu-
tions “will discourage resolution by the spouses and will make their
ultimate reconciliation more difficult.”  A marital rape exemption
“requires the spouses to resolve their problems and differences on
their own,” and “[w]hen two people are able, on their own, to com-
promise differences and resolve problems, a greater mutual respect
and bond might be expected to result than if the couple had to resort
to the legal system for resolution.”34  In fact, the Colorado Supreme
Court insisted that a married couple is able to reconcile so thoroughly
after marital rape that the couple’s relationship is indistinguishable
from any other marriage.  The court stated that “the marital exception
may remove a substantial obstacle to the resumption of normal mar-
ital relations.”35  The Model Penal Code similarly stresses the nor-
mality of the reconciliation process after marital rape, reasoning that
32 Id. § 213.1 cmt. 8(c), at 345; see also Michael Gary Hilf, Marital Privacy and Spousal
Rape, 16 NEW ENG. L. REV. 31, 43–44 (1980) (“[P]roviding a party with immunity in cases
of simple spousal rape can be justified by the state’s interest in respecting marital privacy
. . . .”).
33 See Hilf, supra note 32, at 31 n.*.
34 Id. at 34; see also id. at 34 n.15 (“There are two possible problems that can arise
when marital disputes become involved with the legal system.  First, knowledge by the
spouses that the law can step in may pose impediments to direct resolution of disagree-
ments by the spouses. . . . The second problem is that interspousal efforts at reconciliation
may well be frustrated by a rape prosecution.”); Ralph Slovenko, Rape of a Wife by Her
Husband, MED. ASPECTS HUM. SEXUALITY, July 1974, at 65, 66 (“[I]t would not help the
marital situation to send the husband off to prison.”); Kenneth A. Cobb & Nancy R.
Schauer, Legislative Note, Michigan’s Criminal Sexual Assault Law, 8 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 217, 233 (1974) (“[Permitting marital rape prosecutions where the couple lived
together at the time of the rape] might act as an obstacle to reconciliation.”); Comment,
Rape and Battery Between Husband and Wife, 6 STAN. L. REV. 719, 725 (1954) (“If recon-
ciliation between married persons is to be encouraged, it would appear best to allow a
husband to be prosecuted for rape only after absolute and final divorce.”).
35 People v. Brown, 632 P.2d 1025, 1027 (Colo. 1981) (en banc) (emphasis added).
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“[t]he problem with abandoning the [marital] immunity in many such
situations [‘of rape by force or threat’] is that the law of rape, if
applied to spouses, would thrust the prospect of criminal sanctions
into the ongoing process of adjustment in the marital relationship.”36
These arguments assume that avoiding marital conflict makes both
husbands and wives better off, even if wives are left without the full
protection of the criminal law from rape.  The arguments contend that
the insuperable obstacle to marital reconciliation and harmony is not
marital rape itself, but a wife’s decision to pursue a marital rape prose-
cution, which creates an unbridgeable divide in a marriage that oper-
ates against the true interests of both spouses.  The purported solution
is to prevent a wife from making such a mistake by denying her the
right to choose it.
There is also a less prominent defense of modern marital rape
exemptions, which I call the vindictive wife argument.  This argument
asserts that states should maintain marital rape exemptions to prevent
vengeful wives from falsely charging their husbands with marital rape,
especially during divorce proceedings.37
The vindictive wife argument insists yet more bluntly than the
claims from marital privacy or marital reconciliation that women are
poor decisionmakers whose judgments and statements cannot be
36 MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES, supra note 31, at § 213.1 cmt. 8(c), at
345 (emphasis added).
37 See, e.g., Hilf, supra note 32, at 42 (“[Spousal rape] laws may exacerbate existing
marital problems by providing another level of escalation for marital disputes with a con-
comitant danger of false accusations.”); Criminal Law—Rape—Husband Cannot Be Guilty
of Raping His Wife, 82 DICK. L. REV. 608, 613 n.39 (1977–1978) (“The drastic penalty
attached to rape, in comparison with the penalty for assault or fraud, would significantly
alter the bargaining power of the wife.  The seriousness of the charge increases its effec-
tiveness as a threat (hence, as a weapon of vengeance), particularly if chances of success
are essentially comparable.”); Francis Baumli, The Matriarchy’s Arsenal:  A Pessimistic
Appraisal, TRANSITIONS, May/June 2004, at 1, 5 (“[T]he new nuclear bomb of the divorce
wars . . . . was a false allegation of spousal rape. . . . This weapon would prevail against even
the most honorable of men since it would be the man’s word against the woman’s, and our
society always believes the woman over the man.”); David Margolick, Rape in a Marriage
Is No Longer Within Law, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 1984, at 6E (“‘In a nasty custody fight,
where a husband and wife are really playing hardball, a woman could threaten that unless
her husband became more reasonable, she would charge him with a rape she says he com-
mitted six months earlier,’ [Professor Yale Kamisar of the University of Michigan Law
School] said.  ‘Given how embarrassing it might be to have to face these charges, they
could become a very powerful weapon.’  To offset such possibilities, he suggested that the
Legislature require married women to bring rape charges within a fixed period of time
. . . .”); George F. Will, When Custom Doesn’t Work Anymore, WASH. POST, Dec. 28, 1978,
at A23 (“[I]t is a grave business when the law empowers one partner to charge the other
with a felony punishable by 20 years in prison.  The problems of proof relating to the
charge of rape in marriage are obvious, as is the potential for abuse of the charge in
divorce proceedings.  It is less obvious that there are fully compensating social benefits
from a law distinguishing from others this particular category of assault.”).
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trusted.  The argument can cite no actual evidence indicating that
wives are likely to file false charges of marital rape.  To the contrary,
the available data suggests that the incidents of marital rape that
women report to law enforcement authorities tend to be extremely
brutal and relatively easy to prove.38  But the vindictive wife argument
fits within a long legal tradition contending that women are particu-
larly unreliable when reporting rape.39
The vindictive wife argument concedes that marital conflict is
possible, while asserting that the sources of such conflict are women’s
bad decisions, rather than men’s.  The argument focuses on the mar-
ital discord that would be created and the injury that would be sus-
tained if a wife falsely accused her husband of marital rape.  It does
not acknowledge the marital discord created or the injury sustained
when a wife is subject to actual acts of marital rape that marital rape
exemptions leave legalized.  For instance, an Arizona state representa-
tive defending his state’s marital rape exemption invoked the specter
of a wife falsely charging rape, explaining that “‘if one person decides
for whatever reason that they would like to attack the other person,
this is a very serious way to get it done.’”40  A Connecticut state legis-
lator concluded that “since society is already burdened with these
kinds of women [‘vengeful wives’], . . . the last thing we need is a law
making it illegal for a husband to sexually assault his wife.”41  An
Iowa state senator observed that “‘[t]here are certain people who are
always wanting to get even,’” and insisted that “‘there are other reme-
dies, rather than going after something that is natural and making that
a criminal offense.’”42  A Colorado state representative predicted that
criminalizing marital rape would mean that “‘[a]ll of a sudden [a wife]
gets tired of [her husband] and she yells ‘Rape!’’”43  A Virginia state
legislator justified his support for a marital rape exemption by
insisting that when a couple is divorcing “‘[t]here is no lie too outra-
38 See Hasday, supra note 16, at 1489 & n.423.
39 See, e.g., 1 MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 635
(Philadelphia, Robert H. Small 1st Am. ed. 1847) (1736) (“[Rape] is an accusation easily to
be made and hard to be proved, and harder to be defended by the party accused, tho never
so innocent.”).
40 Howard Fischer, Spousal Rape Bill Is Tossed by Panel, ARIZ. DAILY STAR, Mar. 11,
2005, at A4 (quoting Arizona State Representative Mark Anderson).
41 Dick Polman, Sexual Assault in the Home:  Is Marriage a License To Rape?,
HARTFORD ADVOC., Feb. 18, 1981, at 2 (reporting comments of Connecticut General
Assemblyman Alfred Onorato, who previously spent eleven years as a state prosecutor).
42 Iowa ‘Marital Rape’ Measure Is Moving, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Mar. 24, 1989, at
16 (quoting Iowa State Senator Joe Coleman).
43 Phillips, supra note 30, at B1 (quoting Colorado State Representative Mary Anne
Tebedo).
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geous.’”44  Here again, defenders of marital rape exemptions maintain
that the exemptions serve the shared interests of husbands and wives,
or at least their shared legitimate interests.  The vindictive wife argu-
ment asserts that marital rape exemptions cost wives nothing of real
value because the exemptions prevent women only from taking
actions against their husbands that no one would defend.
The contention that limiting women’s rights to pursue marital
rape charges leaves both husbands and wives better off has allowed
exemption supporters confronted with the reform efforts of the
modern feminist movement to avoid explaining why the law should
favor the interests of husbands who commit marital rape at the
expense of wives who are subject to marital rape.  But the contempo-
rary defense of marital rape exemptions inflicts at least two distinct
injuries on women.  First, and most notably, this defense has suc-
ceeded in substantially limiting the legal remediation available for
marital rape.  Second, this defense denies that marital rape and mar-
ital rape exemptions cause real harm to women.  Modern arguments
for marital rape exemptions insist that the exemptions protect marital
intimacy and harmony, and maintain that women seeking prosecution
for marital rape are poor decisionmakers who are mistaken about
their own best interests or vindictive.  Exemption supporters have
assumed that women’s desire for prosecution is irrelevant because
securing the right to be fully protected from marital rape would pur-
portedly leave women worse off.
The overwhelming evidence of marital rape’s harmfulness makes
it remarkable that marital rape exemptions have remained so persis-
tent.  But as we will see, the arguments deployed to defend marital
rape exemptions in the last years of the twentieth century are part of a
long tradition contending that women benefit from restrictions on
their rights and opportunities.  These arguments draw on suspicions
about women’s decisionmaking and commitments to women’s domes-
ticity that have deep roots and vibrant life within the legal regulation
of women’s status.
Similar reasoning about women is evident in the legislation and
jurisprudence enacting and defending limits on women’s right to
abortion.
44 Marital Rape Bill Advances in House:  Delegates Give Preliminary OK, DAILY PRESS
(Hampton-Newport News, Va.), Feb. 8, 2002, at C4 (quoting Virginia State Delegate
Kenneth Melvin).
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B. Antiabortion Legislation and Jurisprudence
Abortion regulation strikingly illustrates how claims that limiting
women’s rights serves women’s own interests have expanded their
scope in recent years to shape more aspects of women’s legal status.
In Roe v. Wade (1973),45 the Supreme Court understood abortion reg-
ulation as a problem of conflicting rights and interests:  a woman’s
(qualified) right to an abortion versus a state’s interest in protecting
the woman’s health and the potential life of the fetus.46 Roe
attempted to balance those rights and interests through a framework
that gave women access to abortion in the first trimester of pregnancy,
permitted states to regulate abortion after the first trimester “in
ways . . . reasonably related to maternal health,” and allowed states to
prohibit abortion after fetal viability, except where abortion was nec-
essary to preserve the woman’s life or health.47 Roe’s articulation of
the abortion right suggested some doubts about women’s decision-
making capacity.  The Court’s opinion notoriously insisted that the
first-trimester “abortion decision and its effectuation must be left to
the medical judgment of the pregnant woman’s attending physician,”
rather than stating that this decision was to be left to a woman’s own
judgment.48  But Roe never claimed that women could not make rea-
sonable decisions to have abortions, or that women seeking abortions
and states attempting to enforce antiabortion laws had aligned inter-
ests best served by denying women abortion rights.
As early as the 1980s, however, antiabortion activists began to
more systematically develop the argument that women who wanted
abortions were poor decisionmakers who would regret their abortions
if they managed to obtain them.  This contention, which recalled
themes from the nineteenth-century antiabortion movement,49 also
shared fundamental continuities with the modern defense of marital
rape exemptions.  Antiabortion advocates assumed that women’s true
responsibilities and ultimate roles were familial, and that women’s
45 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
46 See id. at 154, 162.
47 Id. at 164–65.
48 Id. at 164 (emphasis added).
49 See, e.g., HORATIO ROBINSON STORER, WHY NOT?:  A BOOK FOR EVERY WOMAN
14 (Boston, Lee & Shepard 1866) (“[C]ases of insanity in women from the physical shock
of an induced abortion, or from subsequent remorse, are not uncommon.”); id. at 79 (“We
have now seen that the induction of a forced abortion is, in reality, a crime against the
infant, its mother, the family circle, and society; that it is attended with extreme danger,
whether immediate or remote, to the mother’s happiness, to her health, mental and phys-
ical, and to her life . . . .”); JOHN TODD, SERPENTS IN THE DOVES’ NEST 10 (Boston, Lee &
Shepard 1867) (“[I]f any one thinks she can do [abortion] without the guilt of murder, she
is greatly mistaken.  The very remembrance of this guilt has often upset the reason, and by
remorse turned the doer into madness.”).
December 2009] PROTECTING THEM FROM THEMSELVES 1479
efforts to evade or delay domesticity were inherently suspect.  They
insisted that women, men, and society as a whole would be better off
if women could be prevented from opting out of motherhood.
In 1982, Nancyjo Mann founded Women Exploited by Abortion
(WEBA) to promote the proposition that legal access to abortion was
not a “‘right’” for women to pursue and demand, but “a trap” for
women to avoid and resist.50  By 1986, WEBA had over one hundred
local chapters throughout the country.51  Mann insisted that abortion
was “dangerous to both the physical and mental health of women.”52
She discounted the possibility of differences between women and par-
ticularly stressed the psychological risks of abortion, contending that
“almost all” women who have abortions “suffer from emotional or
psychological aftershocks.”53
David Reardon’s Aborted Women:  Silent No More (1987) used a
survey of 252 WEBA members as the basis for one of the most devel-
oped expressions of the argument that prohibiting abortion, except
when needed to save the pregnant woman’s life, would serve the
aligned interests of unborn children, society, and the pregnant women
who would be unable to obtain abortions if abortion were criminal-
ized.54  Reardon began from the premise that women’s decisions to
have abortions were not to be trusted.  He posited “that the only time
women seek abortion is when they are experiencing psychic dis-
tress.”55  Even if women sincerely thought they wanted to abort,
“almost all” women who had abortions would experience “psycholog-
ical problems” because of them.56  Reardon stressed women’s funda-
mental similarity.  The only women possibly able to escape
psychological injury after abortion were flawed, unnatural women
who were “aggressive rather than nurturing”57 and “addicted to the
pseudo-happiness of their own plans, careers, and possessions.”58
Indeed, “[t]he more difficult the circumstances prompting abortion,
the more likely it [was] that the woman [would] suffer severe” psycho-
logical injury after abortion.59  In measuring this injury, moreover, it
was appropriate to ignore women’s own perceptions of their exper-
50 Nancyjo Mann, Foreword to DAVID C. REARDON, ABORTED WOMEN:  SILENT NO
MORE, at ix, xxii–xxiii (1987).
51 See id. at xxiii.
52 Id. at x–xi (emphasis omitted).
53 Id. at xi.
54 See REARDON, supra note 50, at 4, 320.
55 Id. at 167.
56 Id. at 21.
57 Id. at 138.
58 Id. at 140.
59 Id. at 163 (emphasis omitted).
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iences and state of mind.  Reardon explained that many of the women
psychologically damaged by abortion denied or did not realize that
they had been harmed.60
By July 1987, the argument that abortion harms women was influ-
ential enough within the antiabortion movement, and the antiabortion
movement was influential enough within the White House, that
President Ronald Reagan directed his ardently antiabortion Surgeon
General, C. Everett Koop,61 “to issue a comprehensive medical report
on the health effects, physical and emotional, of abortion on
women.”62  According to Koop, the idea for this report originated
with “one of the neophyte right-wingers on the White House staff”
who believed that a study from the Surgeon General finding that
abortion impaired women’s mental health could be used to reverse
Roe.63  The House Committee on Government Operations later iden-
tified that staffer as Dinesh D’Souza,64 who would go on to become a
prominent conservative writer.65  In fact, Koop ultimately refused to
write the report that Reagan ordered, finding in January 1989 that the
existing scientific literature did not provide conclusive evidence about
whether abortion “cause[s] or contribute[s] to psychological
problems.”66
In the years since Koop’s refusal to write Reagan’s desired report,
many additional scientific and medical studies have challenged the
empirical claim that most women who have abortions come to regret
their decisions and to suffer psychological injury because of abor-
tion.67  These studies consistently find that women’s distress tends to
60 See id. at 21, 142.
61 For an example of Koop’s antiabortion advocacy, see C. Everett Koop, The Right To
Live, HUM. LIFE REV., Fall 1975, at 65, 87 (“It takes almost nothing to move from abortion
which is killing of an unborn baby in the uterus to the killing of the retarded, the crippled,
the sick, the elderly.”).
62 Ronald Reagan, Remarks at a White House Briefing for Right to Life Activists, 2
PUB. PAPERS 895, 898 (July 30, 1987).
63 C. EVERETT KOOP, KOOP:  THE MEMOIRS OF AMERICA’S FAMILY DOCTOR 274
(1991); see also Medical and Psychological Impact of Abortion:  Hearing Before the Sub-
comm. on Human Resources and Intergovernmental Relations of the H. Comm. on Govern-
ment Operations, 101st Cong. 247 (1989) (statement of C. Everett Koop, Surgeon General
of the United States); Letter from C. Everett Koop, Surgeon Gen., to Ronald Reagan,
President of the U.S. 2 (Jan. 9, 1989) (on file with author and the New York University Law
Review; C. Everett Koop Papers, History of Medicine Division, National Library of
Medicine).
64 See H.R. REP. NO. 101-392, at 3 (1989).
65 See, e.g., DINESH D’SOUZA, ILLIBERAL EDUCATION:  THE POLITICS OF RACE AND
SEX ON CAMPUS (1991).
66 Letter from C. Everett Koop to Ronald Reagan, supra note 63, at 2; see also id. at 4.
67 See, e.g., Nancy Felipe Russo & Jean E. Denious, Controlling Birth:  Science, Politics,
and Public Policy, 61 J. SOC. ISSUES 181, 185 (2005) (“There is no scientific basis for con-
structing abortion as a severe physical or mental health threat.” (citations omitted)); Nada
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be greatest before abortion rather than after it and that the incidence
of negative reactions to abortion is low.68
Yet this scientific and medical literature has not halted the
growing prevalence and influence of the argument that abortion psy-
chologically injures women and leaves them regretting their decision
to abort.  The contention that abortion harms women may be empiri-
cally unsupported, but it draws on deep wells of understanding about
women’s nature, roles, and capacities, and resonates with a long tradi-
tion of mutual benefits discourse defending limits on women’s rights.
Moreover, leaders of the antiabortion movement have become even
more convinced of their argument’s political power.  By the mid-
1990s, they were explaining in increasingly explicit terms that if abor-
tion restrictions served the shared interests of pregnant women,
fetuses, abortion opponents, and society as a whole, then people con-
cerned about women’s rights and status might be persuaded to sup-
port antiabortion laws on the ground that the laws would leave
everyone better off, including women denied abortions.  The claim
that abortion harms women could be the antiabortion movement’s
response to feminist contentions that women’s equality depends on
access to legal abortion.69
David Reardon’s Making Abortion Rare:  A Healing Strategy for
a Divided Nation (1996) stressed more openly than his earlier work
that focusing on fetal welfare would be insufficient to win the legal
prohibition of abortion because “the middle majority of Americans”
was too concerned about the welfare and autonomy of pregnant
women seeking abortions.70  Reardon argued that the antiabortion
movement needed to “tap into our society’s hypersensitivity to
women’s rights” in order to develop an “unbeatable” case for abor-
L. Stotland, The Myth of the Abortion Trauma Syndrome, 268 JAMA 2078, 2078 (1992)
(“This is an article about a medical syndrome that does not exist.”).
68 See, e.g., Nancy E. Adler et al., Psychological Responses After Abortion, 248 SCIENCE
41, 41–43 (1990); Paul K.B. Dagg, The Psychological Sequelae of Therapeutic Abortion—
Denied and Completed, 148 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 578, 578, 583 (1991); Brenda Major et al.,
Personal Resilience, Cognitive Appraisals, and Coping:  An Integrative Model of Adjustment
to Abortion, 74 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 735, 741 (1998); Jo Ann Rosenfeld,
Emotional Responses to Therapeutic Abortion, 45 AM. FAM. PHYSICIAN 137, 137 (1992).
69 For examples of sex equality arguments for abortion rights, see Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C.
L. REV. 375, 382–86 (1985); Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA.
L. REV. 955, 1016–28 (1984); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under
Law, 100 YALE L.J. 1281, 1308–24 (1991); Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the Body:  A His-
torical Perspective on Abortion Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L.
REV. 261, 351–80 (1992).
70 DAVID C. REARDON, MAKING ABORTION RARE:  A HEALING STRATEGY FOR A
DIVIDED NATION, at ix–x (1996); see also id. at 25–26.
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tion prohibition.71  By emphasizing “that every abortion hurts a
woman, as well as her child, we can defend every unborn child by
defending the best interests of the mother, knowing that her best
interests are never served by abortion.”72  Reardon’s conviction “that
abortion is inherently harmful to women” reflected his assessment of
every woman’s true nature and ultimate responsibility:  “It is simply
impossible to rip a child from the womb of a mother without tearing
out a part of the woman herself—a part of her heart, a part of her joy,
a part of her maternity.”73  Women who thought abortion would serve
their interests were terrible decisionmakers, reaching “a hasty, rash,
ill-informed, or even dangerous decision” “[o]ut of ignorance or
despair.”74
John and Barbara Willke’s Why Not Love Them Both?:  Ques-
tions & Answers About Abortion (1997) similarly focused on how the
antiabortion movement could appeal “to those in the middle” by
stressing that abortion prohibitions served the aligned interests of
unborn children, women seeking abortions, and abortion opponents.75
The Willkes, like many other antiabortion writers, contended that
women who have abortions experience a “Post Abortion Syn-
drome,”76 in which “[g]uilt is ever-present in many guises, along with
regret, remorse, shame, lowered self-esteem, insomnia, dreams and
nightmares, flash backs, anniversary reactions.”77  The ubiquity of this
syndrome, which purportedly resembled the post-traumatic stress that
many Vietnam veterans described,78 meant that abortion was not in a
woman’s interest, even if she thought it was at the time.  Where pro-
choice advocates insisted that “‘a woman has the right to choose,’”
the Willkes advised that “[t]he pro-life one-liner should be ‘why not
love them both?’”79
The antiabortion movement has not succeeded so far in securing
the legal prohibition of abortion, but advocates, courts, and legisla-
tures have already utilized the argument that abortion harms women
to establish important limitations on women’s abortion rights.  Con-
sider the contrast between the Supreme Court’s abortion jurispru-
71 Id. at 132, xi.
72 Id. at 13.
73 Id. at 5.
74 Id. at 41, 13.
75 JOHN C. WILLKE & BARBARA H. WILLKE, WHY NOT LOVE THEM BOTH?:  QUES-
TIONS & ANSWERS ABOUT ABORTION 6 (1997).
76 Id. at 46.
77 Id. at 47.
78 See id. at 46–47.
79 Id. at 17.
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dence from a quarter century ago and the Court’s two most important
recent decisions on abortion.
In City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc.
(1983),80 the Court appeared wary of claims that abortion harms
women and confident about women’s decisionmaking capacities.
Akron struck down a municipal “informed consent” ordinance pro-
viding that a woman could not obtain an abortion unless her physician
first informed her of, among other things, “the physical and emotional
complications that may result from an abortion.”81  The Court found
“that much of the information required is designed not to inform the
woman’s consent but rather to persuade her to withhold it alto-
gether.”82  For instance, the ordinance’s description of “numerous
possible physical and psychological complications of abortion, [was] a
‘parade of horribles’ intended to suggest that abortion is a particularly
dangerous procedure.”83 Akron held that informed consent require-
ments for abortion were unconstitutional if “designed to influence the
woman’s informed choice between abortion or childbirth.”84  The
Court also struck down a municipal requirement that delayed the
availability of abortion until twenty-four hours after the pregnant
woman had signed her consent form,85 explaining that “if a woman,
after appropriate counseling, is prepared to give her written informed
consent and proceed with the abortion, a State may not demand that
she delay the effectuation of that decision.”86
In contrast, the Court expressed more concern about the pur-
ported psychological consequences of abortion, and more doubts
about the decisionmaking capacities of women seeking abortions, in
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey (1992).87
By this time, antiabortion advocacy contending that abortion injures
women psychologically had become much more developed and
reached the amicus briefs submitted to the Court.88  The Casey plu-
rality held that states could constitutionally enforce “informed con-
sent” laws designed “to persuade the woman to choose childbirth over
80 462 U.S. 416 (1983).
81 Id. at 442.
82 Id. at 444.
83 Id. at 444–45 (footnote omitted).
84 Id. at 444.
85 See id. at 449–50.
86 Id. at 450–51.
87 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
88 See Brief of Feminists for Life of America et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondents & Cross Petitioners at 8, Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (Nos. 91-744 & 91-902) (“In
addition to the obvious physical complications, abortion has a profound psychological
impact upon many women that can be found in the testimonies of women who have under-
gone abortion.” (footnote omitted)).
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abortion.”89  The plurality also held that states could impose twenty-
four hour waiting periods before abortion.90
The Casey plurality’s explanation of its holdings emphasized risks
associated with abortion, rather than risks associated with limiting
women’s access to abortion.  Where the Akron Court had implied that
the contention that abortion was associated with serious psychological
complications was simply a stratagem to discourage abortion, the
Casey plurality stressed that the state had “a substantial government
interest” in requiring that women be informed “of the health risks of
abortion” and noted that “[i]t cannot be questioned that psychological
well-being is a facet of health.”  The psychological risk that the Casey
plurality was particularly concerned about was the risk that a woman
would later come to regret her abortion because of her faulty deci-
sionmaking at the time:  “In attempting to ensure that a woman
apprehend the full consequences of her decision, the State furthers the
legitimate purpose of reducing the risk that a woman may elect an
abortion, only to discover later, with devastating psychological conse-
quences, that her decision was not fully informed.”91
The Casey plurality proceeded to reject the notion “that there is a
constitutional right to abortion on demand.”92  This phrase, a staple of
antiabortion literature before much of that literature adopted the lan-
guage of women’s welfare,93 insisted that the fact that a woman had
decided to have an abortion for her own reasons was insufficient to
give her a right to have the abortion, even in the first trimester of
pregnancy.  The Casey plurality agreed that a state need not trust
women’s decisionmaking capacity to that extent.  For instance, a
twenty-four hour waiting period before abortion might impose addi-
tional obstacles, delays, and expense.94  But it was constitutional for a
state to mandate “some period of reflection”95 in order to “facilitate[ ]
89 Casey, 505 U.S. at 878 (opinion of O’Connor, Kennedy, Souter, JJ.).
90 See id. at 885–87.
91 Id. at 882.
92 Id. at 887 (emphasis added).
93 See, e.g., Ronald Reagan, Abortion and the Conscience of the Nation, HUM. LIFE
REV., Spring 1983, at 7, 7 (“Our nationwide policy of abortion-on-demand through all nine
months of pregnancy was neither voted for by our people nor enacted by our legislators—
not a single state had such unrestricted abortion before the Supreme Court decreed it to be
national policy in 1973.”); Patrick J. Buchanan, Editorial, GOP Must Stand Firm on Abor-
tion, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Oct. 25, 1989, at 7B (“Abortion on demand is the great
evil of our time, the ultimate act of selfishness and cruelty, the defining statement of the
Me Generation in the Now Decade.”).
94 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 885–86 (opinion of O’Connor, Kennedy, Souter, JJ.).
95 Id. at 885.
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the wise exercise of” the abortion right,96 “to ensure that this choice is
thoughtful and informed.”97
The argument that women’s abortion rights should be limited
because abortion harms women reached its highest peak to date in
Gonzales v. Carhart (2007).98 Carhart upheld the Partial-Birth Abor-
tion Ban Act of 2003,99 which prohibited a procedure for performing
abortion even when that procedure would be the safest method of
abortion.100  In upholding the statute, the Court steadfastly avoided
recognizing the conflicting interests and competing claims at stake in
abortion regulation.  As an initial matter, the Court did not focus on
the conflict between a woman’s right to abortion and a state’s interest
in the potential life of a fetus.  This silence was perhaps understand-
able because the statute at issue would not prevent any abortions and
thus could not be justified as a means of protecting fetuses.  But the
Court also did not focus on a conflict that the statute directly
presented:  The Act prioritized Congress’s expressive interests in ban-
ning an abortion procedure over women’s health and safety interests
in having access to the safest abortion procedure possible.  Indeed, the
Act prioritized Congress’s expressive interests in honoring life even in
circumstances where a woman wanted access to a safer abortion pro-
cedure in order to protect her capacity to bear children in the future.
The Court did not explain why Congress’s expressive concerns appro-
priately outweighed women’s health and safety.  Instead, the Court
insisted with little discussion or elaboration that the Act served eve-
ryone’s aligned interests and had only benefits, rather than costs.  In
doing so, Carhart explicitly endorsed the claim that women’s abortion
rights should be restricted because women regret their abortions.
Carhart was not quite willing to echo the antiabortion literature’s con-
tention that regret plagues all or almost all women who have abor-
tions,101 but the Court came close.  The Court assumed that some
women will regret having an abortion and used that assumption as a
reason to ban all women from undergoing a type of abortion
procedure.
In Carhart, as in the antiabortion literature, the argument that
antiabortion laws protect women from regret had two central prem-
ises.  The first premise was that women’s fundamental nature was
maternal. Carhart’s only evidence that some women will regret their
96 Id. at 887.
97 Id. at 872.
98 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
99 See id. at 132–33.
100 See id. at 141–43.
101 See supra text accompanying notes 50–60, 70–79.
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abortions was the assertion of an antiabortion amicus brief collecting
affidavits from women who claimed their abortions harmed them and
the Court’s own commonsense intuition, grounded in its under-
standing of women’s true nature as mothers.  As the Court explained:
Respect for human life finds an ultimate expression in the bond
of love the mother has for her child.  The Act recognizes this reality
as well.  Whether to have an abortion requires a difficult and painful
moral decision.  While we find no reliable data to measure the phe-
nomenon, it seems unexceptionable to conclude some women come
to regret their choice to abort the infant life they once created and
sustained.  Severe depression and loss of esteem can follow.102
The Court went on to identify women who regretted their abortions as
“mother[s].”103
Carhart’s second premise was that women were poor deci-
sionmakers whose judgments could not be trusted, especially if they
led women away from their family responsibilities.  The Court
assumed that women had undergone the abortion procedure now stat-
utorily prohibited without understanding what the procedure entailed.
Carhart took it to be “self-evident that a mother who comes to regret
her choice to abort must struggle with grief more anguished and
sorrow more profound when she learns, only after the event,” the
abortion procedure’s exact form.104  In the Court’s view, however, the
appropriate legal solution to this purported problem was not to
require that women be given more information before abortion.
Women’s judgment could not be relied on to that degree.  The solu-
tion was to strip every woman of the possibility of choosing the pro-
hibited method of abortion.
The contention that limiting women’s rights to pursue alterna-
tives to domesticity leaves everyone better off, including women
themselves, retains persistent appeal.  The claim resonates with pow-
erful convictions about the primacy of women’s maternal responsibili-
ties and deep-seated doubts about the decisionmaking capacities of
women seeking other choices, in ways that prompt legal authorities
and advocates to dismiss further explanation or elaboration as
unnecessary.
102 Carhart, 550 U.S. at 159 (citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 852–53; Brief of Sandra Cano et al.
as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 22–24, Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (No. 05-380)); see
also Brief of Sandra Cano et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, supra, at app.
11–106 (quoting “Relevant Portion of 178 Sworn Affidavits of Post Abortive Women of the
approximately 2,000 on file with The Justice Foundation”).
103 Carhart, 550 U.S. at 159.
104 Id. at 159–60.
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II
MUTUAL BENEFITS ARGUMENTS AGAINST AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
Compared to the law governing women’s legal status, the law of
race relations is more often described in terms emphasizing conflict
rather than consensus.  But the premise that both whites and people
of color benefit from restrictions on people of color’s rights and
opportunities has prominently shaped race regulation in the United
States.  Indeed, arguments contending that whites and people of color
have aligned interests in defeating civil rights initiatives have
expanded their reach in recent years.
The jurisprudence and literature on affirmative action strikingly
illustrate the resurgence of mutual benefits arguments for rejecting
civil rights efforts.  The Supreme Court’s first opinions considering the
constitutionality of race-based government affirmative action pro-
grams stressed the conflicting interests of racial groups and explained
that the Constitution required limits on affirmative action in order to
minimize the harms to whites.  The Court’s early focus on the injuries
that affirmative action could impose on whites mirrored the dominant
concerns in early academic criticism of affirmative action.105  Within
just a few years and a few opinions, however, the Court and oppo-
nents of affirmative action off the bench increasingly began defending
constitutional restrictions on permissible affirmative action policies in
the language of mutuality, insisting that limits on affirmative action
serve the shared interests of all races and protect people of color from
the injuries that affirmative action would otherwise inflict upon them.
105 See NATHAN GLAZER, AFFIRMATIVE DISCRIMINATION:  ETHNIC INEQUALITY AND
PUBLIC POLICY 201 (1975) (“[White immigrants] came to a country which provided them
with less benefits than it now provides the protected groups.  There is little reason for them
to feel they should bear the burden of the redress of a past in which they had no or little
part, or to assist those who presently receive more assistance than they did.  We are indeed
a nation of minorities; to enshrine some minorities as deserving of special benefits means
not to defend minority rights against a discriminating majority but to favor some of these
minorities over others.”); Lino A. Graglia, Special Admission of the “Culturally Deprived”
to Law School, 119 U. PA. L. REV. 351, 352 (1970) (“Discrimination in favor of some racial
or ethnic groups necessarily is or appears to be discrimination against others. . . .
[D]iscrimination in favor of particular racial or ethnic groups is largely or entirely unneces-
sary to achieve true equality in educational opportunity and is unjust to those who have
been denied such opportunity on other grounds.”); Antonin Scalia, The Disease as Cure:
“In Order To Get Beyond Racism, We Must First Take Account of Race.,” 1979 WASH. U.
L.Q. 147, 153–54 (“I am not willing to prefer the son of a prosperous and well-educated
black doctor or lawyer—solely because of his race—to the son of a recent refugee from
Eastern Europe who is working as a manual laborer to get his family ahead.”); William
Van Alstyne, Rites of Passage:  Race, the Supreme Court, and the Constitution, 46 U. CHI. L.
REV. 775, 801 (1979) (“The ‘brunt’ of the [affirmative action] plan [in Bakke] was borne by
individuals like Allan Bakke—white applicants with reasonably good application portfo-
lios, but not among the very best portfolios.”).
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Regents of the University of California v. Bakke (1978)106 exem-
plifies the Court’s initial approach to affirmative action. Bakke struck
down a state medical school admissions program that reserved sixteen
spaces for people of color in an entering class of one hundred stu-
dents.107  Justice Lewis Powell’s controlling opinion in Bakke
explaining why this program was unconstitutional focused on the com-
peting interests of whites and people of color, and the harms that
affirmative action programs caused whites.  Powell began from the
premise that the history of race relations in the United States, unlike
the history of relations between men and women, was riven with con-
flict and oppression.  He explained that “the perception of racial clas-
sifications as inherently odious stems from a lengthy and tragic history
that gender-based classifications do not share.”108  With that premise
in place, Powell stressed that the medical school’s affirmative action
program would exacerbate racial animosity and conflict.  This account
adopted the perspective of white applicants to the medical school,
who Powell assumed bore “no responsibility for” societal patterns of
racial discrimination.109  Powell emphasized that the medical school’s
affirmative action program imposed enormous burdens on these
“innocent”110 white applicants by “totally foreclos[ing]” them “from
competition for the 16 special admissions seats in every Medical
School class.”111  The result, Powell warned, would be white “outrage”
and “deep resentment.”112
Powell’s discussion of affirmative action programs that could sur-
vive constitutional review also emphasized the conflicting interests of
whites and people of color.  Powell identified “the attainment of a
diverse student body” as “a constitutionally permissible goal for an
institution of higher education.”113  He argued that schools seeking
diversity could use “race or ethnic background” as “a ‘plus’” in an
applicant’s favor, where that plus did “not insulate the individual from
comparison with all other candidates for the available seats.”114  In
Powell’s view, this form of affirmative action was constitutionally
106 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
107 See id. at 269–71, 289 (opinion of Powell, J.).
108 Id. at 303.
109 Id. at 310.
110 Id. at 307.
111 Id. at 305.
112 Id. at 294 n.34.  Powell also briefly made an argument that would come to dominate
the Court’s later affirmative action cases, contending that “preferential programs may only
reinforce common stereotypes holding that certain groups are unable to achieve success
without special protection based on a factor having no relationship to individual worth.”
Id. at 298.
113 Id. at 311–12.
114 Id. at 317.
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acceptable precisely because it minimized the harm that affirmative
action programs inflicted on whites.  Powell’s preferred form of
affirmative action kept every admissions slot open to competition
from applicants of every race and provided that white applicants could
also benefit from a school’s focus on diversity where they had qualities
“likely to promote beneficial educational pluralism.”115  Powell con-
tended that this type of affirmative action weighed a white applicant’s
qualifications “fairly and competitively,” and gave the white applicant
“no basis to complain of unequal treatment under the Fourteenth
Amendment.”116
Eight years later, Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education117 simi-
larly stressed the conflicting interests of whites and people of color.
Wygant struck down a school board decision to grant some teachers
preferential protection against layoffs because of their race or national
origin.118  Justice Powell’s plurality opinion recognized that the layoff
plan benefited people of color and had been intended to help achieve
“racial equality.”  But the plurality held that the layoff plan was not a
constitutionally permissible means of accomplishing even legitimate
affirmative action goals because the “burden” that layoffs imposed on
“innocent” whites was “too intrusive.”119  Justice Sandra Day
O’Connor’s concurring opinion likewise insisted that affirmative
action plans could “not impose disproportionate harm on the inter-
ests, or unnecessarily trammel the rights, of innocent individuals
directly and adversely affected by a plan’s racial preference.”120
In more recent years, however, the Court has abruptly turned
from its early focus on the burdens that affirmative action imposes on
whites, perhaps because this initial approach proved insufficiently
effective at countering arguments for affirmative action that were
grounded in commitments to improving the status of people of color.
Without explaining its quick switch in focus, the Court now empha-
sizes with the certainty of common sense that affirmative action pro-
grams must be restricted in scope and duration in order to protect
people of color from the injuries that affirmative action would other-
wise inflict upon them.  This account maintains that limiting and even-
tually eliminating affirmative action serves the aligned interests of
whites, people of color, people opposed to affirmative action pro-
grams, and people seeking to participate in those programs.  The
115 Id.
116 Id. at 318.
117 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
118 See id. at 269–70, 282–84 (plurality opinion).
119 Id. at 282–83.
120 Id. at 287 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
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Court purportedly does not need to choose between conflicting inter-
ests and competing sides, and explain why the harms that affirmative
action causes whites have more constitutional weight than the benefits
that affirmative action confers on people of color.  Instead, the
Court’s opinions insist that people of all races and with every view on
affirmative action will all be better off in their own way if people of
color do not have access to affirmative action programs.  This shift in
judicial emphasis has drawn on contemporaneous trends in the litera-
ture criticizing affirmative action, which has also increasingly focused
on the injuries that affirmative action programs assertedly inflict on
people of color.121
The Court’s shift to a mutual benefits argument against affirma-
tive action was perhaps first visible in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson
Co. (1989),122 a transitional opinion between the Court’s initial
approach to affirmative action and its more recent one. Croson struck
down an affirmative action plan in Richmond, Virginia, that required
white-owned contracting businesses receiving city construction con-
tracts to subcontract at least thirty percent of the monetary amount of
the contracts to minority-owned businesses.123  In detailing the plan’s
unconstitutionality, the Croson plurality discussed the harm the plan
inflicted on whites who were denied “the opportunity to compete for a
fixed percentage of public contracts based solely upon their race.”124
121 See STEPHEN L. CARTER, REFLECTIONS OF AN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION BABY 233
(1991) (“The likely demise, or severe restriction, of racial preferences . . . . is our chance to
make ourselves free of the assumptions that too often underlie affirmative action, assump-
tions about our intellectual incapacity and other competitive deficiencies.”); SHELBY
STEELE, THE CONTENT OF OUR CHARACTER:  A NEW VISION OF RACE IN AMERICA 120
(1990) (“Racial preferences implicitly mark whites with an exaggerated superiority just as
they mark blacks with an exaggerated inferiority.  They not only reinforce America’s oldest
racial myth but, for blacks, they have the effect of stigmatizing the already stigmatized.”);
Jim Chen, Diversity and Damnation, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1839, 1903 (1996) (“Because it
must resort to a separate and unequal scheme of dual evaluative standards, race-based
affirmative action stamps even its worthiest beneficiaries with an indelible stigma.”); Carl
Cohen, Why Race Preference Is Wrong and Bad, in CARL COHEN & JAMES P. STERBA,
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND RACIAL PREFERENCE:  A DEBATE 3, 110 (2003) (“[Affirmative
action’s] worst consequences . . . are the injuries it inflicts upon the racial minorities pre-
ferred, creating widespread resentment, reinforcing stereotypes, and humiliating its pur-
ported beneficiaries in the eyes of their classmates, colleagues, workmates, teachers—and
even in their own eyes.  Race preference has been an utter catastrophe for the ethnic
minorities it was intended to benefit.”); Richard Delgado, Affirmative Action as a
Majoritarian Device:  Or, Do You Really Want To Be a Role Model?, 89 MICH. L. REV.
1222, 1226 n.20 (1991) (“Affirmative action is soothing, limiting, and therapeutic for whites
but psychologically and materially injurious to populations of color.”).
122 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
123 See id. at 477–78, 485–86.
124 Id. at 493 (plurality opinion).
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But the plurality’s emphasis was turning to an account of the different
kinds of harm that affirmative action imposed on people of color.
The plurality identified three injuries that people of color, who
had not brought the Croson suit,125 would purportedly experience if
they were permitted access to the affirmative action plan that the
majority-black Richmond City Council had adopted.126  First, the plu-
rality contended that the affirmative action plan “carr[ied] a danger of
stigmatic harm” and could “promote notions of racial inferiority” on
the theory that people of color needed affirmative action because of
their lesser competence.127  The plurality presented no evidence that
any people of color agreed that Richmond’s affirmative action plan
was stigmatizing or thought that potential stigma was a good reason to
strike down the plan.  But the plurality stressed the risk of stigma
nonetheless.  Second, the plurality argued that the affirmative action
plan could leave people of color worse off because it might “lead to a
politics of racial hostility.”128  The danger of racial animosity and the
advantages of avoiding racial conflict had been a central concern of
Powell’s Bakke opinion, but the Croson plurality appeared to identify
affirmative action programs that might cause whites to resent people
of color, rather than past and present race discrimination that might
cause people of color to resent whites, as the primary source of
modern racial animosity.  The argument that Richmond’s affirmative
action plan could lead to racial animosity seemed to assume that soci-
etal practices of racial discrimination had not already created such
animosity.  Third, affirmative action programs like Richmond’s plan,
which were intended to counter “past societal discrimination,” would
actually harm people of color by preventing the development of “a
society where race is irrelevant to personal opportunity and
achievement.”129
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena (1995)130 reiterated Croson’s
insistence that affirmative action injures people of color. Adarand
held that the Court would apply strict scrutiny to all race-based gov-
ernment affirmative action.131 Adarand’s explanation of the need for
strict scrutiny recounted the litany of harms to people of color that
Croson had identified:  Affirmative action assertedly stigmatized
people of color, aggravated racial animosity, and fostered racial
125 See id. at 481–83 (majority opinion).
126 See id. at 495 (plurality opinion).
127 Id. at 493.
128 Id.
129 Id. at 505–06 (majority opinion).
130 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
131 See id. at 235.
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prejudice.  The Court reported that affirmative action “‘inevitably is
perceived by many as resting on an assumption that those who are
granted this special preference are less qualified in some respect that
is identified purely by their race.  Because that perception—especially
when fostered by the Congress of the United States—can only exacer-
bate rather than reduce racial prejudice, it will delay the time when
race will become a truly irrelevant, or at least insignificant, factor.’”132
Justice Clarence Thomas, appointed to the Court in 1991,
devoted his entire concurring opinion in Adarand to the premise that
affirmative action harms racial minorities.  Thomas contended that
affirmative action programs taught “many” whites “that because of
chronic and apparently immutable handicaps, minorities cannot com-
pete with them without their patronizing indulgence.”  Affirmative
action programs thus “[i]nevitably” “engender[ed] attitudes of superi-
ority” on the part of whites or made whites “resent[ful]” of racial
minorities, while “stamp[ing] minorities with a badge of inferiority”
and potentially “caus[ing] them to develop dependencies or to adopt
an attitude that they are ‘entitled’ to preferences.”  Thomas castigated
affirmative action as a form of “racial paternalism.”133
Justice Thomas’s opinion built on and elaborated the shift in
emphasis within the Court’s affirmative action jurisprudence, but
there was considerable irony in Thomas’s condemnation of “pater-
nalism.”  Although Thomas purported to identify the interests of
people of color as a class, many people of color supported the affirma-
tive action programs that Thomas vilified and believed they benefited
from those programs.  For instance, Justice John Paul Stevens’s dissent
in Adarand noted that “[n]o beneficiaries of the specific program
under attack today have challenged its constitutionality—perhaps
because they do not find the preferences stigmatizing, or perhaps
because their ability to opt out of the program provides them all the
relief they would need.”134  Thomas’s argument assumed that he and
similarly-minded Justices knew better than these people of color what
was best for them.  Like the Adarand majority, Thomas maintained
that both people of color and whites benefited if people of color were
denied access to affirmative action programs they advocated and
sought to use.
Thus far, proponents of the argument that affirmative action
harms even its supposed beneficiaries have not succeeded in estab-
lishing the unconstitutionality of all forms of race-based government
132 Id. at 229 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 545
(1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
133 Id. at 241 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
134 Id. at 247 n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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affirmative action. Grutter v. Bollinger (2003)135 upheld the
University of Michigan Law School’s affirmative action program,136
endorsing Justice Powell’s argument from Bakke “that student body
diversity is a compelling state interest that can justify the use of race in
university admissions.”137
But Grutter affirmed severe limits on the constitutionality of
race-based government affirmative action.  State universities may con-
sider an applicant’s race or ethnicity only “flexibly as a ‘plus’ factor in
the context of individualized consideration of each and every appli-
cant,” and every admissions slot must remain open to competition
from applicants of all races.138 Grutter also held that “race-conscious
admissions policies must be limited in time.”139  It endorsed a twenty-
five year lifespan for the constitutionality of race-based affirmative
action plans designed “to further an interest in student body diversity
in the context of public higher education,” stating that “[w]e expect
that 25 years from now, the use of racial preferences will no longer be
necessary to further the interest approved today.”140
Even with these restrictions in place, moreover, Grutter’s deci-
sion to uphold an affirmative action program provoked sharp criticism
within the Court.  Justice Thomas’s separate opinion in Grutter, for
instance, presented a yet more elaborate account of the harm that
affirmative action assertedly causes people of color.  Thomas repeated
the charges in his Adarand concurrence, adding that “no social science
has disproved” these charges.141  The addition implicitly acknowl-
edged that Thomas and his compatriots had presented no empirical
evidence to substantiate the claim that affirmative action leaves
people of color worse off, but contended that the burden of proof
rests with affirmative action supporters.  Justice Thomas proceeded to
identify still more harms that affirmative action programs purportedly
inflict on people of color.  He contended that affirmative action pro-
grams injure their direct participants by diminishing the participants’
incentives to study hard,142 and then placing them in schools and jobs
where they are not prepared to succeed.143  He reported that affirma-
tive action programs harm people of color who would have won
admission without affirmative action because they are “tarred as
135 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
136 See id. at 343.
137 Id. at 325.
138 Id. at 334.
139 Id. at 342.
140 Id. at 343.
141 Id. at 373 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
142 See id. at 377.
143 See id. at 372.
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undeserving” by the very existence of affirmative action.144  Thomas
also appeared to criticize affirmative action plans for not going far
enough.  Michigan’s admissions policy, for example, left black men
underrepresented at the law school,145 and did “nothing for those too
poor or uneducated to participate in elite higher education.”146
Justice Thomas assumed throughout his opinion that the people cre-
ating and supporting affirmative action programs were white “know-
it-all elites”147 who were conducting “their social experiments on
other people’s children.”148  The assumption ignored the people of
color who had participated in the advocacy, creation, and implementa-
tion of affirmative action programs,149 and the people of color who
had voluntarily availed themselves of such programs.150  But the
assumption allowed Thomas to avoid explaining why this support and
participation persists, if affirmative action inflicts so much damage on
people of color.
The Grutter precedent’s future prospects have already become
uncertain.  In Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School
District No. 1 (2007),151 the Court returned to its emphasis on the
harm that affirmative action programs assertedly inflict on people of
color. Parents Involved struck down student assignment plans in
Seattle, Washington, and Jefferson County, Kentucky, that sometimes
used race to allocate students between public schools.152  The plans
were intended to counter patterns of racial segregation in public edu-
cation,153 a project that would appear to benefit students of all races.
In addition, it was difficult to argue that the plans could stigmatize
anyone as less qualified because the school districts assigning children
to public elementary and high schools were not judging any student’s
relative qualifications or likelihood of academic success.154  But the
Parents Involved plurality nonetheless maintained that the student
assignment plans inflicted a now-familiar litany of harms on people of
144 Id. at 373.
145 See id. at 372 n.11.
146 Id. at 354 n.3.
147 Id. at 373 n.11.
148 Id. at 372.
149 See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 126.
150 See, e.g., Brief of the University of Michigan Asian Pacific American Law Students
Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 20, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (No.
02-241) (“This Court should not require a system whereby the most selective law schools –
the schools that open the door widest to the most prestigious jobs, professorships and judi-
cial clerkships – effectively shut their doors to qualified minority students.”).
151 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
152 See id. at 709–13, 716–17.
153 See id.
154 See id.
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color:  They “promote ‘notions of racial inferiority and lead to a
politics of racial hostility,’ ‘reinforce the belief, held by too many for
too much of our history, that individuals should be judged by the color
of their skin,’ and ‘endorse race-based reasoning and the conception
of a Nation divided into racial blocs, thus contributing to an escalation
of racial hostility and conflict.’”155  Here too, the plurality contended
that it need not choose between competing sides or explain why the
costs of affirmative action outweigh the benefits.  The plurality
insisted that both whites and people of color would be better off
without affirmative action, no matter what the supporters of affirma-
tive action programs and the people seeking to participate within
those programs might think.  The Justices purported to know better
that people of color would come to rue the consequences if the Court
did not severely restrict the scope and duration of affirmative action.
Mutual benefits arguments for limiting the rights and opportuni-
ties available to women and people of color remain prominent and
practically effective, constituting a deep-seated structural similarity
that connects such seemingly disparate contemporary debates as the
contests over marital rape exemptions, antiabortion laws, and race-
based affirmative action.  As Parts III and IV will explore, modern
mutual benefits discourse draws on longstanding ways of reasoning
about women and people of color, and a lengthy history of arguments
contending that both groups are better off with fewer rights and
opportunities.  Mutual benefits arguments have long been particularly
prominent in eras, like our own, when reform movements strive to
improve the status of women and people of color.  The reform activity
presumably undercuts claims that the legal system should privilege
men over women, or whites over people of color.
The extensive record of mutual benefits discourse may help
explain why courts, legislators, and commentators continue to take
mutual benefits arguments to be matters of common sense requiring
little elaboration, support, questioning, or investigation.  Modern
mutual benefits claims resonate with and invoke a long tradition of
mutual benefits arguments in ways that may give this discourse a spe-
cial power to persuade, too quickly with too little evidence.  But his-
torical mutual benefits arguments explicitly assumed that women and
people of color were unusually poor decisionmakers unable to under-
stand their own best interests, insisting that women prioritize domes-
ticity above all else and that people of color were better off making
155 Id. at 746 (plurality opinion) (quoting City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S.
469, 493 (1989) (plurality opinion); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 657 (1993); Metro Broad.,
Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 603 (1990) (O’Connor, J., dissenting)).
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fewer claims and demands on white society.  Many of the practices
that legal authorities and advocates once promoted as mutual benefits
are now widely repudiated as pernicious inequality.
III
A LEGAL HISTORY OF PROTECTING WOMEN FROM THEMSELVES
Defenders of women’s inequality have reported throughout
American history that women’s unequal status serves the joint inter-
ests of women and men.  One of the most common justifications that
lawmakers, jurists, and advocates have offered for limitations on
women’s legal rights has been that those limitations protect women
from themselves and the self-defeating decisions they would make if
given more freedom.  Legal authorities and commentators have
repeatedly explained that women are much better off with circum-
scribed legal rights that leave women securely tied to their family obli-
gations, instead of unmoored from their domestic roles and vulnerable
to the consequences of their own bad judgment.  Indeed, the historical
prominence of mutual benefits arguments in defending now-rejected
practices of sex inequality is so striking that the Supreme Court
pointed to the perniciousness of historical mutual benefits claims in
creating its modern constitutional jurisprudence on sex discrimination.
A plurality of the Court explained in 1973 that America’s “long and
unfortunate history of sex discrimination. . . . was rationalized” as
serving women’s own interests, and concluded that this “attitude of
‘romantic paternalism’ . . . in practical effect, put women, not on a
pedestal, but in a cage.”156
Unsurprisingly, mutual benefits discourse has consistently tended
to be most visible during periods in which limits on women’s rights are
under systematic attack.  This Part focuses on two historical examples.
The first explores how courts and treatises defended the common
law’s subordination of married women in the nineteenth century, an
era in which a burgeoning woman’s rights movement challenged the
common law regime with a wide-ranging reform agenda seeking
women’s legal equality.  The second explores how legal deci-
sionmakers and commentators defended women-only protective labor
laws in the early twentieth century after the Supreme Court struck
down protective labor legislation that applied to male workers and
156 Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973) (plurality opinion); see also Sail’er
Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 485 P.2d 529, 541 (Cal. 1971) (in bank) (“Laws which disable women
from full participation in the political, business and economic arenas are often character-
ized as ‘protective’ and beneficial. . . . The pedestal upon which women have been placed
has all too often, upon closer inspection, been revealed as a cage.”).
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many feminists began arguing that the legal status of protective labor
laws should be the same for men and women.
A. The Common Law of Marriage
Nineteenth-century courts and treatises championing married
women’s subordinated status at common law often explained that
restricting wives’ legal rights furthered the aligned interests of women
and men because wives released from common law constraints would
make choices, exercise privileges, and take actions that would prove
disastrous for themselves and their families alike.  This argument
became especially prevalent after the emergence of the woman’s
rights movement in the middle of the century made the common law
look like it required more defending than ever before.
Under common law coverture, a wife’s legal identity was almost
entirely subsumed, or covered, by her husband’s.  Married women
could not sue, be sued, make contracts, own property, or keep their
own earnings.  Husbands had legal custody and control over a married
couple’s children.157
Courts and treatises consistently stressed that the legal restraints
coverture placed on married women promoted the shared interests of
husbands and wives.  Indeed, they claimed that if one spouse enjoyed
any advantage, it was the wife rather than the husband.  William
Blackstone, whose Commentaries on the Laws of England provided
what became the classic and most influential definition of coverture in
the United States, explained that the common law safely ensconced a
wife under her husband’s “wing, protection, and cover.”158  He went
on to “observe, that even the disabilities, which the wife lies under,
are for the most part intended for her protection and benefit.  So great
a favourite is the female sex of the laws of England.”159  Following in
Blackstone’s wake, American courts and treatises routinely insisted
that coverture was designed for “[t]he protection of the wife,”160 “for
her good and for that of offspring.”161
157 See NORMA BASCH, IN THE EYES OF THE LAW:  WOMEN, MARRIAGE, AND PROP-
ERTY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY NEW YORK 17, 51–55 (1982); MICHAEL GROSSBERG,
GOVERNING THE HEARTH:  LAW AND THE FAMILY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 25
(1985); ELIZABETH BOWLES WARBASSE, THE CHANGING LEGAL RIGHTS OF MARRIED
WOMEN, 1800–1861, at 7–24 (1987).
158 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES *430.
159 Id. at *433.
160 Short v. Battle, 52 Ala. 456, 459 (1875).
161 EDWARD W. SPENCER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS 101
(1911); see also OCIE SPEER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MARRIED WOMEN IN TEXAS 24
(1901) (“[A wife’s] separate existence and identity as a distinct person was suspended
during coverture, or incorporated in that of her husband under whose protection she per-
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The contention that coverture served women’s and men’s aligned
interests—or favored women—might seem puzzling given the severe
restrictions imposed on women’s legal capacities and the mounting
protests of the woman’s rights movement.  Modern legal authorities
and commentators have denounced coverture’s subordination of
women.  For instance, the Supreme Court in 1980 celebrated cover-
ture’s demise, reporting that a woman is no longer “regarded as
chattel or demeaned by denial of a separate legal identity and the dig-
nity associated with recognition as a whole human being.”162  In the
nineteenth century, woman’s rights advocates directly contested the
premise that women’s legal inequality advanced the shared interests
of women and men.  The Declaration of Sentiments, adopted at the
1848 Seneca Falls convention that sparked the organization of the
woman’s rights movement,163 condemned common law rules that
made a woman “if married, in the eye of the law, civilly dead.”  The
Declaration described “[t]he history of mankind” as “a history of
repeated injuries and usurpations on the part of man toward woman,
having in direct object the establishment of an absolute tyranny over
her.”164  Elizabeth Cady Stanton, who would become a leading
woman’s rights advocate and the movement’s most creative intellec-
tual force, explained at Seneca Falls that the “care and protection”
men supposedly offered women was “such as the wolf gives the
lamb—such as the eagle the hare he carries to his eyrie!!”165
However, nineteenth-century courts and treatises expounding
and enforcing coverture principles reasoned from a particular under-
standing of women’s nature.  They argued in favor of coverture even
more vigorously in the face of challenges from the woman’s rights
movement.
formed everything.”); HENRY H. SPRAGUE, WOMEN UNDER THE LAW OF MASSACHUSETTS
26–27 (Boston, W.B. Clarke & Carruth 1884) (“Yet the very disabilities which the common
law laid upon the wife were, for the most part, intended, says Blackstone again, in his
Commentaries, for her protection and benefit, ‘so great a favorite is the female sex of the
laws of England’!”).
162 Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 52 (1980).
163 See 1 HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE 67–74 (Elizabeth Cady Stanton et al. eds.,
Ayer Co. 1985) (1881).
164 Declaration of Sentiments (1848), reprinted in id. at 70, 70.
165 ADDRESS OF MRS. ELIZABETH CADY STANTON, DELIVERED AT SENECA FALLS &
ROCHESTER, N.Y[.] JULY 19TH & AUGUST 2D, 1848, at 12 (New York, Robert J. Johnston
1870); see also SARAH M. GRIMKE, LETTERS ON THE EQUALITY OF THE SEXES, AND THE
CONDITION OF WOMAN 10 (Boston, Isaac Knapp 1838) (“I ask no favors for my sex.  I
surrender not our claim to equality.  All I ask of our brethren is, that they will take their
feet from off our necks, and permit us to stand upright on that ground which God designed
us to occupy.”).
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Coverture’s defenders maintained that women’s appropriate
sphere was limited to their family roles as wives and mothers, so cov-
erture kept women exactly where they belonged.  Treatises reported
that women were “delicate, affectionate, confiding, dependent,” while
men were “capable of planning, providing, and protecting.”166  A hus-
band’s role was “‘to get, to travel abroad, and to defend.’”  A wife’s
role was “‘to save, to stay at home, and to distribute that which is
gotten, for the nurture of the children and family.’”167  Supreme
Court Justice Joseph Bradley, explaining in 1873 why states could con-
stitutionally exclude women from the legal profession, similarly rea-
soned that “[t]he harmony . . . of interests and views which belong, or
should belong, to the family institution is repugnant to the idea of a
woman adopting a distinct and independent career from that of her
husband.”  “The paramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfil
the noble and benign offices of wife and mother.”168
Coverture’s advocates also insisted that women were dreadful
decisionmakers.  Common law treatises repeatedly contended that
women with the freedom to structure their lives as they saw fit would
make choices that would leave them worse off.  For instance, treatises
were certain that if married women had the right to enter into con-
tracts, the agreements they reached would be disastrous for the
women themselves.  The first American family law treatise, published
in 1816, anticipated that a married woman with the right to “bind her-
self by her contracts . . . would be liable to be arrested [perhaps for
unpaid debts], taken in execution, and confined in a prison.”169  Forty-
five years later, another treatise reported that married women’s con-
tract rights were still limited to protect women “against their own
improvidence.”170  A 1900 treatise similarly declared that “feminine
166 SPEER, supra note 161, at 23–24; see also EPAPHRODITUS PECK, THE LAW OF PER-
SONS OR DOMESTIC RELATIONS 26 (1913) (stressing “the greater strength and activity of
the man, the greater gentleness and especially the maternal function of the woman”).
167 PEREGRINE BINGHAM, THE LAW OF INFANCY AND COVERTURE 184 (Exeter, George
Lamson 1st Am. ed. 1824) (quoting THOMAS SMITH, THE COMMONWEALTH OF ENGLAND);
see also JAMES SCHOULER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF THE DOMESTIC RELATIONS 52–53
(Boston, Little, Brown, & Co. 1870) (same).
168 Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141 (1873) (Bradley, J., concurring); see
also In re Goodell, 39 Wis. 232, 245 (1875) (“The law of nature destines and qualifies the
female sex for the bearing and nurture of the children of our race and for the custody of
the homes of the world and their maintenance in love and honor.  And all life-long callings
of women, inconsistent with these radical and sacred duties of their sex, as is the profession
of the law, are departures from the order of nature; and when voluntary, treason against
it.”).
169 TAPPING REEVE, THE LAW OF BARON AND FEMME 98 (New Haven, Oliver Steele
1816).
170 WILLIAM H. CORD, A TREATISE ON THE LEGAL AND EQUITABLE RIGHTS OF MAR-
RIED WOMEN 207 (Philadelphia, Kay & Bro. 1861).
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weakness” was “the determining factor” accounting for continued
restrictions on married women’s rights to contract.  “The inexperience
of the woman and the probability that her confidence, which she so
freely accords, may be taken advantage of, are the chief considera-
tions at the basis of such provisions.”171
More generally, defenders of the common law of marriage
explained that coverture promoted marital harmony and aided both
husbands and wives by facilitating the swift resolution of marital con-
flicts and discouraging wifely dissent.  Placing decisionmaking
authority with one spouse was “essential to family peace” “[i]n case of
differences between husband and wife as to the management of the
household.”172  Moreover, coverture gave a married woman—who
was, “legally speaking, at her husband’s mercy”—an enormous incen-
tive to stay in her husband’s good graces and avoid entering into mar-
ital disagreements.  This obviously benefited husbands, but treatises
assured their readers that “her constant study to please has kept him
generally merciful,” leaving wives “on the whole as well protected, as
well advanced” as men.173
In contrast, treatise writers predicted that if the woman’s rights
movement won more freedom for married women to make enforce-
able decisions contrary to their husbands’ wishes, wives would destroy
their marital harmony, arouse the fierce (and potentially violent)
opposition of their husbands, and undermine their own welfare.  This
argument contended that expanding married women’s formal legal
rights would mean that wives would exercise even less practical
power, largely because of what we would now characterize as the
malevolence of their husbands.  Peregrine Bingham explained that
“[t]hey who, from some ill-defined notion of justice or generosity,
would extend to women an absolute equality, only hold out to them a
dangerous snare.”174  If “the law by conferring equality on wives, . . .
release[d] them from that necessity of pleasing which is at present
171 ISIDOR LOEB, THE LEGAL PROPERTY RELATIONS OF MARRIED PARTIES 34 (1900).
172 JOSEPH R. LONG, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS 119 (1905); see
also BINGHAM, supra note 167, at 182 (“[I]t is absolutely necessary for the preservation of
peace, that where two or more persons are destined to pass their lives together, one should
be endued with such a pre-eminence as may prevent or terminate all contestation.”); W.C.
RODGERS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS 107 (Chicago, T.H. Flood
& Co. 1899) (“Both cannot be paramount, and it is clear that if the authority of each be the
same much friction might follow.  The wife might insist on living in one place, the husband
in another.”).
173 JAMES SCHOULER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF HUSBAND AND WIFE 4 (Boston,
Little, Brown, & Co. 1882); see also 1 WILLIAM H. CORD, A TREATISE ON THE LEGAL AND
EQUITABLE RIGHTS OF MARRIED WOMEN 13 (Philadelphia, Kay & Bro. 2d ed. 1885)
(same).
174 BINGHAM, supra note 167, at 182–83.
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imposed upon them,” “it would in fact, instead of strengthening, only
subvert the empire they now enjoy.”  A husband “forgets his self-love
while secure of his prerogative, and derives enjoyment even from con-
cession.”  But if a wife acquired “rival power” with her husband, “the
continually wounded pride of the stronger party would soon rouse up
in him a dangerous antagonist for the weaker.”  Husbands “would
turn all [their] efforts to the forcible establishment of that prerogative
which is now subdued by the dominion of female influence.”175  James
Schouler agreed that “[w]oman’s weakness has been her strongest
weapon.”176  He warned women against their efforts “to make the
marriage terms equal,” reporting that legal equality or even
expanding wives’ rights would unleash “the violence of man’s unbri-
dled appetite.”177  History demonstrated that women and marriage
were both better off under laws “degrading to woman” than under
laws “elevating her independence to the utmost.”178
In sum, the common law of marriage and its defenders sought to
render wives doubly voiceless.  First, coverture denied married
women almost all aspects of a separate legal identity, pervasively sub-
ordinating wives to their husbands’ authority.  Second, coverture’s
advocates insisted that the mounting reform efforts of the woman’s
rights movement should be ignored because women had no legitimate
cause for complaint.  Coverture purportedly served the convergent
interests of men and women, granting husbands control, wives protec-
tion, and both domestic peace.  Women freed from common law stric-
tures would make decisions and suffer consequences counter to their
true interests and their proper roles as wives and mothers.
B. Women-Only Protective Labor Legislation
The premise that women would harm themselves if they had the
autonomy associated with legal equality and the freedom to distance
themselves from domesticity remained a powerful rationale for lim-
iting women’s rights in the early twentieth-century debate over
women-only protective labor legislation.  The Supreme Court in
Lochner v. New York (1905)179 struck down protective labor legisla-
tion that applied to male workers.  After Lochner, courts and com-
mentators successfully employed rhetorical structures familiar from
the nineteenth-century defense of common law coverture to establish
that protective labor legislation, such as maximum hours laws or
175 Id. at 183.
176 SCHOULER, supra note 173, at 4; see also CORD, supra note 173, at 13 (same).
177 SCHOULER, supra note 173, at 15.
178 Id. at 4.
179 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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prohibitions on working in certain occupations or at night, could still
be constitutional when applied exclusively to female workers.
The Lochner Court, like lower courts before it, believed that pro-
tective labor legislation regulating male workers failed to recognize
men’s full citizenship and to respect men’s constitutional right to
freedom of contract.  Men with little functional bargaining power in
the marketplace may have practically experienced their “freedom”
from some protective labor laws as more of a burden than a boon.
But Lochner reasoned that statutes “limiting the hours in which
grown and intelligent men may labor to earn their living” were “med-
dlesome interferences with the rights of the individual.”180  Male
workers were “able to assert their rights and care for themselves
without the protecting arm of the State, interfering with their indepen-
dence of judgment and of action.”181  The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court had similarly explained in 1886 that applying protective labor
legislation to a male worker was “an insulting attempt to put the
laborer under a legislative tutelage, which is not only degrading to his
manhood, but subversive of his rights as a citizen of the United
States.”182
Advocates of women-only protective labor legislation success-
fully defended the statutes after Lochner by contending that restric-
tions on freedom of contract—when applied to women, but not men—
served the aligned interests of the restricted workers and society as a
whole. Muller v. Oregon (1908),183 in which the Supreme Court
upheld women-only protective labor legislation “without questioning
in any respect the decision in Lochner,”184 reflected the mindset.  The
Muller Court recognized that women might not have initially agreed
to a legal regime that accorded women fewer rights than men.  Man,
the Court reported, “established his control at the outset by superior
physical strength, and this control in various forms, with diminishing
intensity, has continued to the present.”185  But like nineteenth-
century judges and treatises, the Muller Court was confident that the
system of women’s legal subordination, once established, operated in
women’s interest and protected them.  Despite the changes the
woman’s rights movement had wrought, Muller explained, woman
“still looks to her brother and depends upon him.”  In the Court’s
view, women-only protective labor legislation fit smoothly within the
180 Id. at 61.
181 Id. at 57.
182 Godcharles v. Wigeman, 6 A. 354, 356 (Pa. 1886).
183 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
184 Id. at 423.
185 Id. at 421.
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common law framework.  Protective labor laws also operated to both
women’s “benefit” and “for the benefit of all.”186
Of course, there were obstacles to describing women-only protec-
tive labor legislation as advancing women’s interests.  Many women’s
advocates, who did not look fondly upon common law coverture, vig-
orously opposed such legislation.  These feminists rejected mutual
benefits arguments for limiting women’s rights as “nothing but the
familiar attitude of the common law brought back for a second
blooming.”187  They explained that women-only protective labor legis-
lation “purports to protect” women, but actually “protects men
workers from feminine competition.”188  “[T]his latter-day ‘protec-
tion’ is not very different from the method of the common law, which
gave a woman’s property to her husband in order to protect her.”189
Feminist critics argued after Lochner that if protective labor stat-
utes were unconstitutional for men, they were also unconstitutional
for women because women were equal citizens before the law and
under the Constitution.  Feminists acknowledged that the “regard of
discriminations as ‘protection’ is traditional” where women’s legal
status is concerned, but they insisted that “[t]he modern demand of
the modern woman is away with protection, and on with equality.”190
They sought to make women “equals of men” and urged women to
pursue the same strategies for improving working conditions that were
available to male workers, such as unionization.191
In addition to feminist opposition, it was also unclear how many
female workers supported women-only protective labor laws or com-
plied with them.  While women-only protective labor laws may have
helped some women in some situations, these laws limited women’s
choices and employment opportunities, especially because they
applied only to women and subjected them to unwaivable restrictions
on hours, working conditions, and occupations that did not bind men.
Indeed, the modern Supreme Court would ultimately stress the une-
qual constraint on women’s employment prospects and employment
decisions in explaining why women-only protective labor laws are
inconsistent with sex equality.  More than eight decades after its
Muller decision, the Court noted that “[c]oncern for a woman’s
186 Id. at 422.
187 Blanche Crozier, Note, Constitutional Law—Regulation of Conditions of Employ-
ment of Women.  A Critique of Muller v. Oregon, 13 B.U. L. REV. 276, 291 (1933).
188 Id. at 287.
189 Id. at 291.
190 Burnita Shelton Matthews, Women Should Have Equal Rights with Men:  A Reply,
12 A.B.A. J. 117, 120 (1926).
191 Working Women and the Laws, LADIES’ GARMENT WORKER, Nov. 1912, at 11, 11.
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existing or potential offspring historically has been the excuse for
denying women equal employment opportunities” and declared that
“[i]t is no more appropriate for the courts than it is for individual
employers to decide whether a woman’s reproductive role is more
important to herself and her family than her economic role.”192
Nonetheless, defenders of women-only protective labor legisla-
tion in the early twentieth century effectively built their case on the
understanding of women’s nature embedded in common law opinions
and treatises.193  They explained that women’s true responsibilities
and greatest triumphs were domestic, and that the country would
thrive when its women focused on bearing and rearing healthy and
vigorous young citizens. Muller reasoned that women-only protective
labor laws served the joint interests of women and society because the
laws preserved a woman’s capacity for the “proper discharge of her
maternal functions,” protecting both “her own health” and “the well-
being of the race.”194  Lawyers successfully defending another women-
only protective labor law before the Court seven years later stressed
the aligned interests of native-born white women and the nation that
would benefit from their increased reproductive efforts.  The advo-
cates explained that “[t]he limitation of the number of hours of
woman’s labor in gainful occupations to not over a half of her waking
time may check the rapid decline in reproduction of the older
American stocks and in any event leaves her free for the development
of mind and body for wifehood and motherhood.”195
State courts upholding women-only protective labor legislation
similarly contended that such laws left both women and society better
off by respecting women’s reproductive capacities and obligations.
Courts explained that “weakly and sickly women cannot be the
mothers of vigorous children.”  Women-only protective labor legisla-
tion safeguarded both female workers and “the health, morals, and
general welfare of the public”196 because these statutes “preserve[d]
the health, strength, and vigor of women,”197 “insure[d] the produc-
192 UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 211 (1991) (citing Muller v. Oregon,
208 U.S. 412 (1908)).
193 Joan Zimmerman has argued that some advocates of women-only protective labor
legislation hoped that the success of these laws would eventually pave the way for protec-
tive labor legislation that applied to male workers as well. See Joan G. Zimmerman, The
Jurisprudence of Equality:  The Women’s Minimum Wage, the First Equal Rights Amend-
ment, and Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, 1905–1923, 78 J. AM. HIST. 188, 199 & n.15
(1991).  However, the arguments that advocates advanced for women-only protective labor
legislation stressed women’s differences from men.
194 Muller, 208 U.S. at 422.
195 Miller v. Wilson, 236 U.S. 373, 377–78 (1915); see also id. at 384 (upholding statute).
196 W.C. Ritchie & Co. v. Wayman, 91 N.E. 695, 697 (Ill. 1910).
197 People v. Elerding, 98 N.E. 982, 984 (Ill. 1912).
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tion of vigorous offspring by them,”198 left women with “the vitality
necessary to the proper discharge of their maternal functions, the
rearing and education of children, and the maintenance of the
home,”199 and protected “the ultimate strength and virility of the
race.”200
Advocates of women-only protective labor legislation insisted
that women’s fundamental roles and interests were domestic, and pro-
ceeded to explain that women—especially “the great, inarticulate
body of working women”201—were poor decisionmakers with respect
to judgments about whether, when, and how to work outside the
home.  There was considerable irony in this argument because some
of the most prominent proponents of women-only protective labor
legislation after Lochner made sex-neutral laws impossible were
themselves professional women who had greatly benefited from their
own increased access to the marketplace.  But supporters of women-
only protective labor legislation nevertheless maintained that women
left to their own devices made unwise choices about market work that
were contrary to their best interests.  Limiting women’s rights to nego-
tiate the terms of their paid employment purportedly protected
women from themselves.
Some government advocates for women-only protective labor
laws explained that poor female workers, especially those caring for
children, lacked the opportunity for sound decisionmaking and were
too overtaxed to negotiate reasonable labor arrangements.  Mary
Anderson, chief of the Women’s Bureau in the Department of
Labor,202 reported that “[w]omen who are wage-earners with one job
in the factory and another in the home have little time and energy left
to carry on the fight to better their economic status.  They need the
help of other women, and they need labor laws.”203
Other official advocates of women-only protective labor legisla-
tion went further, suggesting that female factory workers had little
inherent capacity to make judgments about work outside the home
that merited legislative respect.  The New York State Factory Investi-
gating Commission, created to investigate women’s factory work at
night, successfully recommended that the state legislature prohibit
198 W.C. Ritchie & Co., 91 N.E. at 697.
199 Elerding, 98 N.E. at 984.
200 Commonwealth v. Riley, 97 N.E. 367, 369 (Mass. 1912), aff’d, 232 U.S. 671 (1914).
201 Alice Hamilton, Protection for Women Workers, 72 FORUM 152, 160 (1924).
202 See Mary Anderson, Should There Be Labor Laws for Women?  Yes, GOOD HOUSE-
KEEPING, Sept. 1925, at 53, 53.
203 Id. at 180.
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such work.204  Its 1913 report explained that “[i]gnorant women can
scarcely be expected to realize the dangers not only to their own
health but to that of the next generation from such inhuman usage.
But it is precisely to prevent such conditions of toil as threaten the
welfare of society that labor laws are designed.”205
Whatever the cause, though, advocates of women-only protective
labor legislation agreed that poor working women were untrustworthy
decisionmakers who should not be permitted to make choices that
impaired their ability to bear and raise children.  Sophonisba
Breckinridge, a social reformer and professor,206 freely admitted that
women-only protective labor laws could severely limit women’s
employment prospects:  “For example, the prohibition against work in
mines or against night work may very well so limit the opportunities
of women to find employment as to result in increased congestion and
decreased wages in such other occupations as are open to them.”207
But Breckinridge explained that the state could nonetheless not
respect individual judgments about paid labor from “improvident,
unworkmanlike, unorganized women, who are yet the mothers, actual
or prospective, of the coming generation.”208  Women-only protective
labor laws recognized what was best for these women, even if the
women themselves did not.  The legislators enacting these statutes
understood “that no group of . . . women workers should be allowed
to unfit themselves by excessive hours of work, by standing, or other
physical strain, for the burden of motherhood which each of them
should be able to assume.”209
Secretary of Labor James J. Davis similarly reasoned that the law
could not abide by women’s decisions to “invade the more rough and
tumble activities of men” because these choices would leave women
“[p]hysiologically . . . hurt,” jeopardizing women, society, and
“humanity itself.”  Davis supported women-only protective labor leg-
islation because he was “forever and unalterably opposed to the
employment of women in any such manner as will destroy or even
204 See People v. Charles Schweinler Press, 108 N.E. 639, 640 (N.Y. 1915).
205 REPORT OF THE NEW YORK STATE FACTORY INVESTIGATING COMMISSION 240
(1913).
206 See, e.g., ELLEN FITZPATRICK, ENDLESS CRUSADE:  WOMEN SOCIAL SCIENTISTS AND
PROGRESSIVE REFORM 176–95, 209–12, 214 (1990).
207 S.P. Breckinridge, Legislative Control of Women’s Work, 14 J. POL. ECON. 107, 108
(1906).
208 Id. at 109.
209 Id. at 107.
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endanger their future motherhood.  Wherever we see women at work
we must think of them in terms of motherhood.”210
Courts reviewing women-only protective labor laws agreed that
women’s capacity to make decisions about market work was suspect,
threatening everyone’s welfare.  As a Pennsylvania court upholding a
maximum hours law for female workers explained,211 the state legisla-
ture was better able to identify women’s real interests and needs than
women themselves:
The state at large is more interested than either employer or
employee in preserving that normal physical condition which
assures to the individual the most of health and happiness and is
least likely to transmit physical, mental or moral defects to suc-
ceeding generations.  The legislature has adjudged that the health of
adult females is imperiled by being employed at labor in the estab-
lishments named for a longer time than stated in the act.  The adult
females, or even the employer, may think otherwise, but self-
interest from a financial standpoint is often an unsafe guide.212
Here too, jurists, lawmakers, and advocates defended limits on
women’s legal rights on the ground that the limits operated to the
mutual benefit of women and society.  Women were meant to devote
themselves to childbearing and childrearing.  If women secured equal
freedom with men, they would make decisions about work outside the
home that would leave them and everyone else worse off.
IV
A LEGAL HISTORY OF MUTUAL BENEFITS ARGUMENTS FOR
RACIAL INEQUALITY
Arguments that people of color were better off with fewer rights
and opportunities also undergirded historical debates about racial
inequality.  Courts, legislators, and commentators asserted that people
of color were naturally suited for subordinate societal roles and main-
tained that racial harmony aiding all races was best achieved when
people of color accommodated themselves to whites, severely limiting
the claims they made on white people and white-dominated
institutions.
This Part explores two striking historical examples of the conten-
tion that legalized white supremacy and African American subordina-
210 Address of Hon. James J. Davis, Secretary of Labor, Before Second Women’s Indus-
trial Conference, Washington 6 (Jan. 18, 1926) (on file with author and the New York
University Law Review; Mary van Kleeck Papers, Sophia Smith Collection, Smith College).
211 See Commonwealth v. Beatty, 15 Pa. Super. 5, 12–13, 20 (1900).
212 Id. at 16–17.
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tion benefited blacks and whites alike.213  The first example focuses on
the defense of slavery that lawmakers and commentators advanced
from the nation’s earliest days and elaborated as the abolitionist
movement grew stronger in the decades preceding the Civil War.  The
second focuses on the defense of racial segregation that legal authori-
ties and advocates initiated before the Civil War and then intensified
in the century after the war as the civil rights movement mounted an
escalating challenge to Jim Crow.
A. Slavery
Defenders of the American system of chattel slavery commonly
explained that bondage furthered the mutual interests of African
American slaves and white masters.  Senators reported that slavery
“has been a great blessing to both of the races—the European and
African”214 and was “indispensable to the peace and happiness of
both.”215  Judges stressed that slavery “subserves the best interests of
213 Mutual benefits arguments for racial inequality also appeared in discussions of
Native Americans.  Presidents and other federal officials in the 1820s and 1830s explained
that removing Native Americans from eastern states helped both whites and Native
Americans.  The advantages to whites were obvious:  Removal permitted whites to take
over the Native Americans’ land. See Andrew Jackson, Second Annual Message (Dec. 6,
1830), in 2 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS,
1789–1908, at 500, 519–20 (James D. Richardson ed., 1909) (“[A] speedy removal . . . . will
place a dense and civilized population in large tracts of country now occupied by a few
savage hunters.”).  However, advocates contended that removal would also leave Native
Americans better off by shielding them from conflict with whites and (somehow) encour-
aging Native Americans to adopt white customs and traditions. See id. at 520 (“[Removal]
will separate the Indians from immediate contact with settlements of whites; free them
from the power of the States; enable them to pursue happiness in their own way and under
their own rude institutions; will retard the progress of decay, which is lessening their num-
bers, and perhaps cause them gradually, under the protection of the Government and
through the influence of good counsels, to cast off their savage habits and become an inter-
esting, civilized, and Christian community.”); Elbert Herring, Report from the Office of
Indian Affairs, in H.R. DOC. NO. 22-2, at 159, 160 (1832) (“[Removal constitutes] the sole
chance of averting Indian annihilation.  Founded in pure and disinterested motives, may it
meet the approval of heaven, by the complete attainment of its beneficent ends!”); Letter
from James Barbour, Dep’t of War, to William McLean, Chairman, House Comm. of
Indian Affairs (Apr. 29, 1828), reprinted in 4 REG. DEB. 2750 (1828) (“[T]he plan of collo-
cating the Indians on suitable lands West of the Mississippi, contains the elements of their
preservation; and will tend, if faithfully carried into effect, to produce the happiest benefits
upon the Indian race.”); James Monroe, To the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States (Jan. 27, 1825), in A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF
THE PRESIDENTS, 1789–1908, supra, at 280, 281 (“[T]he removal of the tribes from the
territory which they now inhabit . . . would not only shield them from impending ruin, but
promote their welfare and happiness.”).
214 CONG. GLOBE, 25th Cong., 3d Sess. 177 (1839) (statement of Senator John Calhoun).
215 John C. Calhoun, Speech on the Reception of Abolition Petitions, Delivered in the
Senate, February 6th, 1837, in 2 REPORTS AND PUBLIC LETTERS OF JOHN C. CALHOUN 625,
630 (Richard K. Cralle´ ed., New York, D. Appleton & Co. 1855).
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both races.”216  Writers declared that slavery was structured “so as
best to promote [the slave’s] own good and that of society.”217
In fact, many of the most prominent proslavery advocates went
further than these claims of mutual benefit to master and slave.
Where abolitionists condemned slavery as an “abyss of misery,”218
slavery defenders insisted that America’s slaves were living in
“Eden.”219  Slaves in the United States were “the happiest three mil-
lions of human beings on whom the sun shines,”220 “the happiest por-
tion of our society,”221 “the happiest of the human race,”222 “the
happiest, and, in some sense, the freest people in the world.”223
“There [was] not upon the face of the earth, any class of people, high
or low, so perfectly free from care and anxiety.”224  Slavery was “the
most perfect system of social and political happiness, that ever has
existed.”225  If slavery disadvantaged anyone according to proslavery
accounts, it was the master whose “labors commence[d] just when the
slave’s end.”226  Unlike the joyous and carefree slave, “[t]he owner of
216 Jos. H. Lumpkin, Judge Lumpkin’s Report on Law Reform, U.S. MONTHLY L. MAG.,
Jan. 1850, at 68, 78.
217 GEORGE FITZHUGH, CANNIBALS ALL! OR, SLAVES WITHOUT MASTERS 116
(Richmond, A. Morris 1857).
218 GEORGE BUCHANAN, AN ORATION UPON THE MORAL AND POLITICAL EVIL OF
SLAVERY 11 (Baltimore, Philip Edwards 1793); see also Speech of Mr. James A. Thome
(May 6, 1834), in DEBATE AT THE LANE SEMINARY, CINCINNATI 7, 8 (Boston, Garrison &
Knapp 1834) (“[I]s it not unquestionable that slavery is the parent of more suffering than
has flowed from any one source since the date of its existence?”).
219 J.H. HAMMOND, TWO LETTERS ON SLAVERY IN THE UNITED STATES, ADDRESSED
TO THOMAS CLARKSON, ESQ. 25 (Columbia, Allen, McCarter, & Co. 1845); see also
George M’Duffie, Governor’s Message, in JOURNAL OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, OF THE
STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA, FOR THE YEAR 1835, at 3, 7 (“In a word, our slaves are
cheerful, contented and happy, much beyond the general condition of the human race,
except where those foreign intruders and fatal ministers of mischief, the emancipationists,
like their arch-prototype in the Garden of Eden, and actuated by no less envy, have
tempted them to aspire above the condition to which they have been assigned in the order
of Providence.”).
220 HAMMOND, supra note 219, at 25.
221 THOMAS R. DEW, REVIEW OF THE DEBATE IN THE VIRGINIA LEGISLATURE OF 1831
AND 1832, at 111 (Richmond, T.W. White 1832); Abolition of Negro Slavery, 12 AM. Q.
REV. 189, 252 (1832) (same).
222 DEW, supra note 221, at 100; Abolition of Negro Slavery, supra note 221, at 241
(same).
223 FITZHUGH, supra note 217, at 29.
224 M’Duffie, supra note 219, at 7.
225 Id.; see also J.P. KENNEDY, SWALLOW BARN, OR A SOJOURN IN THE OLD DOMINION
455 (New York, G.P. Putnam & Co. rev. ed. 1853) (“Having but few and simple wants, they
seem to me to be provided with every comfort which falls within the ordinary compass of
their wishes; and, I might say, that they find even more enjoyment,—as that word may be
applied to express positive pleasures scattered through the course of daily occupation—
than any other laboring people I am acquainted with.”).
226 FITZHUGH, supra note 217, at 26.
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slaves” was “usually condemned to a constant, permanent and anxious
burthen of care and expenditure.”227
This rosy view of slavery, which nineteenth-century abolition-
ists228 and twentieth-century civil rights advocates229 denounced and
debunked, rested on the premise that African Americans were inher-
ently unable to manage their own lives or to function successfully
outside of bondage.  Slavery’s supporters maintained that America’s
slaves were “incapable of taking part with [whites], in the exercise of
self-government.”230  More than that, they were “incapable of self-
preservation.”231  “A negro” had “the power of thought and volition,
and [was] capable of ministering to the cravings of his appetite, and
providing for their gratification, but [did] not generally have judgment
to direct him in what is proper for him, or prudence and self-denial to
restrain him from the use of what is injurious.”232  “[T]he negro” was
“in his moral constitution, a dependant upon the white race; depen-
dant for guidance and direction even to the procurement of his most
indispensable necessaries.  Apart from this protection he ha[d] the
helplessness of a child,—without foresight, without faculty of contri-
vance, without thrift of any kind.”233
227 Peter v. Hargrave, 46 Va. (5 Gratt.) 12, 19 (1848).
228 See CONG. GLOBE, 31st Cong., 1st Sess. app. at 767 (1850) (statement of Representa-
tive Thaddeus Stevens) (“[G]entlemen on this floor, and in the Senate, had repeatedly,
during this discussion, asserted that slavery was a moral, political, and personal blessing;
that the slave was free from care, contented, happy, fat, and sleek.  Comparisons have been
instituted between slaves and laboring freemen, much to the advantage of the condition of
slavery.  Instances are cited where the slave, after having tried freedom, had voluntarily
returned to resume his yoke.  Well, if this be so, let us give all a chance to enjoy this
blessing.  Let the slaves, who choose, go free; and the free, who choose, become slaves.”);
FREDERICK DOUGLASS, MY BONDAGE AND MY FREEDOM 99 (New York & Auburn,
Miller, Orton & Co. 1857) (“The remark is not unfrequently made, that slaves are the most
contented and happy laborers in the world.  They dance and sing, and make all manner of
joyful noises—so they do; but it is a great mistake to suppose them happy because they
sing.  The songs of the slave represent the sorrows, rather than the joys, of his heart; and he
is relieved by them, only as an aching heart is relieved by its tears.”).
229 See Sterling A. Brown, Negro Character as Seen by White Authors, 2 J. NEGRO
EDUC. 179, 186 (1933) (“Designed originally to defend slavery, [the contented slave stereo-
type] is now a convenient argument for those wishing to keep ‘the Negro in his place’—out
of great love for him, naturally—believing that he will be happier so.”).
230 Vance v. Crawford, 4 Ga. 445, 459 (1848); see also M’Duffie, supra note 219, at 6
(“[T]hey are yet wholly unprepared for any thing like a rational system of self-
government.”); GEORGE FITZHUGH, SOCIOLOGY FOR THE SOUTH, OR THE FAILURE OF
FREE SOCIETY 83 (Richmond, A. Morris 1854) (“[I]t is clear the Athenian democracy
would not suit a negro nation, nor will the government of mere law suffice for the indi-
vidual negro.  He is but a grown up child, and must be governed as a child . . . .”).
231 Gorman v. Campbell, 14 Ga. 137, 143 (1853).
232 Collins v. Hutchins, 21 Ga. 270, 274 (1857).
233 KENNEDY, supra note 225, at 453; see also Editorial, DAILY DISPATCH (Richmond),
Aug. 7, 1852, at 1 (“‘Africa, Hayti, and Jamaica, prove that Cuffee cannot get along
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Slavery’s advocates combined their self-serving account of the
nature and capacities of slaves with an extremely partial version of
how American slavery was practiced that ignored the “cruelties”234
and “barbarous inhumanity”235 that abolitionists described.  In the
proslavery vision, African Americans were naturally suited for slavery
and America’s slaveholders had created a benign structure to provide
it.  One United States congressman from Maryland236 called
American slavery a “mild and beneficent guardianship,” “secure from
harm.”237  The Georgia Supreme Court described “the relation of
master and slave in Georgia” as “an institution subject to the law of
kindness to as great an extent as any institution springing out of the
relation of employer and employed, any where existing amongst
men.”238
Proslavery voices routinely insisted that slaves performed less
work, with more security and comfort, than the white working class in
the areas where most abolitionists lived, Europe and the northern
United States.  Compared to the American slaveholding South, “few
countries” left “so much” “to the share of the laborer” and “exacted”
“so little,” or paid “more kind attention” “in sickness or infirmities of
age.”239  In practice, “[t]he free laborer” was “more of a slave than the
negro, because he works longer and harder for less allowance than the
slave, and has no holiday, because the cares of life with him begin
when its labors end.”240  For instance, “in Great Britain the poor and
laboring classes” were “more miserable and degraded, morally and
physically, than [America’s] slaves; to be elevated to the actual condi-
tion of whom, would be . . . a most glorious act of emancipation.”241
In one proslavery poet’s verse, the American slave was:
without a master.  Left to himself, he rapidly deteriorates back again to the savage can-
nibal.’” (quoting the New York Herald)).
234 WILLIAM GOODELL, THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 224
(New York, Am. & Foreign Anti-Slavery Soc’y 3d ed. 1853).
235 AMERICAN SLAVERY AS IT IS:  TESTIMONY OF A THOUSAND WITNESSES 9 (New
York, Am. Anti-Slavery Soc’y 1839).
236 See CHARLES H. BOHNER, JOHN PENDLETON KENNEDY:  GENTLEMAN FROM
BALTIMORE 124–26 (1961).
237 KENNEDY, supra note 225, at 453.
238 Neal v. Farmer, 9 Ga. 555, 582 (1851).
239 Calhoun, supra note 215, at 631.
240 FITZHUGH, supra note 217, at 30.
241 HAMMOND, supra note 219, at 26.
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Guarded from want, from beggary secure,
He never feels what hireling crowds endure,
Nor knows, like them, in hopeless want to crave,
For wife and child, the comforts of the slave.242
Indeed, many of slavery’s defenders maintained that the master-
slave relationship was too close, intimate, caring, and generous to
even resemble employment in the industrial economy.  They stressed
that slavery was best understood as a domestic relation, whose hierar-
chical bonds of reciprocal obligation, mutual affection, and common
concern mirrored the relationship between husband and wife or
parent and child.  Advocates explained that “besides wife and chil-
dren, brothers and sisters, dogs, horses, birds and flowers—slaves,
also, belong to the family circle.”243  “[T]he interests of master and
slave are bound up together, and each in his appropriate sphere natu-
rally endeavors to promote the happiness of the other.”244  They
reported “that there is nothing but the mere relations of husband and
wife, parent and child, brother and sister, which produce a closer tie,
than the relation of master and servant.”  “[T]he slaves of a good
master, are his warmest, most constant, and most devoted friends;
they have been accustomed to look up to him as their supporter,
director and defender.”245
Where proslavery advocates described slavery as a shared
blessing for master and slave, they warned that emancipation would
be a mutual disaster with each race suffering terribly in its own way.
Emancipation could “easily be shown to be utterly subversive of the
interests, security, and happiness, of both the blacks and whites.”246
Whites would be devastated economically.  “[T]he African race,
notoriously idle and improvident,” would leave whites’ plantations
untended.  “Few, very few” would be willing “to do a stroke of work,
none to labor continuously.”247  The production of cotton would
plummet, the commodity’s price would skyrocket, and it would not be
“extravagant to say, that for little more than two millions of negro
slaves, cut loose from their tranquil moorings, and set adrift upon the
untried ocean, of at least a doubtful experiment, ten millions of poor
242 WILLIAM J. GRAYSON, THE HIRELING AND THE SLAVE, CHICORA, AND OTHER
POEMS 44 (Charleston, McCarter & Co. 1856).
243 FITZHUGH, supra note 217, at 301.
244 Id. at 302.
245 DEW, supra note 221, at 109–10; Abolition of Negro Slavery, supra note 221, at 251
(similar).
246 DEW, supra note 221, at 8; Abolition of Negro Slavery, supra note 221, at 193
(similar).
247 HAMMOND, supra note 219, at 34.
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white people would be reduced to destitution, pauperism and
starvation.”248
The former slaves would suffer even more from emancipation—
“a positive curse, depriving them of a guardianship essential to their
happiness.”249  Slavery’s defenders anticipated that emancipation
would leave blacks morally adrift, vulnerable to their own worst
instincts, and subject to potentially genocidal retribution.  Freed
slaves, unable or unwilling to support themselves through work, would
turn to “self-destruction,” “debaucheries,”250 “murder,” and “every
species of crime.”251  “It was well known that they were an indolent
people, improvident, averse to labor:  when emancipated, they would
either starve or plunder.”252  A former slave’s “idleness [would] pro-
duce want and worthlessness, and his very worthlessness and degrada-
tion [would] stimulate him to deeds of rapine and vengeance.”  “[T]he
provoked whites,” in turn, would respond with violence of their
own.253  Proslavery advocates were quick to assert that white violence
against freedmen would be justified, but the threat of white malevo-
lence palpably remained.  Many predicted that the ultimate result of
emancipation would be the “drenching” of “the country in blood” and
even the annihilation of black people in America.254  “‘Ere many
moons went by,’ the African race would be exterminated, or reduced
again to slavery, their ranks recruited . . . by fresh ‘Emigrants’ from
their father land.”255
The American regime of chattel slavery favored the interests of
slaveholders over slaves pervasively, overwhelmingly, and systemati-
cally.  But lawmakers and commentators adopted a convenient
appraisal of the limited capacities of African Americans and an elabo-
rately sanitized account of the practice of slavery in the United States.
Thus armed, they insisted that slavery served the aligned interests of
slaves and masters, and warned that emancipation would be calami-
tous for both groups.  This pattern of championing the legalized
enforcement of white supremacy and African American subordination
248 M’Duffie, supra note 219, at 10.
249 Id. at 6.
250 Thomas Ruffin, Address of Thomas Ruffin Delivered Before the State Agricultural
Society of North Carolina, October 18th, 1855, in 4 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS RUFFIN 323,
330 (J.G. de Roulhac Hamilton ed., 1920).
251 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 235 (1800) (statement of Representative James Jones).
252 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1455 (1790) (statement of Representative William Smith).
253 DEW, supra note 221, at 101; Abolition of Negro Slavery, supra note 221, at 242
(same).
254 Calhoun, supra note 215, at 630.
255 HAMMOND, supra note 219, at 34; see also GRAYSON, supra note 242, at 68–69 (“If
slavery guard his subject race no more, . . . . war’s swift sword, or peace, with slow decay,
Must, like the Indian, sweep his race away.”).
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as a mutual benefit to whites and blacks persisted after slavery’s aboli-
tion in the defense of racial segregation.
B. Racial Segregation
Even before slavery’s end, many whites were eager to find addi-
tional ways to express, enforce, and maintain their hierarchical posi-
tion over African Americans.  Racial segregation laws, in place in
some contexts before emancipation, became a central vehicle for per-
petuating legalized racial inequality in the century after the Civil War.
Yet much like slavery’s supporters, segregationists routinely con-
tended that segregation furthered the shared interests of blacks and
whites, asserted that African Americans opposing segregation did not
understand their own best interests, and warned that integration
would leave both blacks and whites much worse off.
This mutual benefits argument for segregation was visible as early
as the 1840s.  In 1846, African Americans in Boston petitioned the
city’s Primary School Committee seeking the desegregation of city
schools.256  The committee rejected the petition,257 insisting that racial
segregation helped both whites and blacks.  As a subcommittee
explained, interracial contact was inherently harmful to all concerned.
“[T]he less the colored and white people become intermingled, the
better it will be for both races.”  “We maintain, that the true interests
of both races require, that they should be kept distinct.  Amalgama-
tion is degradation.”258
The subcommittee proceeded to report that racial integration
would impair the educational opportunities of whites and blacks alike.
The subcommittee assumed that integrating primary schools would
not reduce racial prejudice, warned that white children “would vex
and insult” their African American classmates,259 and predicted “that
the attendance of the colored children would, in the aggregate, be
seriously diminished.”260  White children, for their part, would desert
integrated public schools in droves, either because “[m]any parents
would not allow their children to associate with colored children” or
because of the “discord” that racial integration would create.261
256 See CITY DOCUMENT NO. 23, REPORT TO THE PRIMARY SCHOOL COMMITTEE, JUNE
15, 1846, ON THE PETITION OF SUNDRY COLORED PERSONS, FOR THE ABOLITION OF THE
SCHOOLS FOR COLORED CHILDREN.  WITH THE CITY SOLICITOR’S OPINION 2 (Boston, J.H.
Eastburn 1846).
257 See id. at 2, 30.
258 Id. at 13.
259 Id. at 14.
260 Id. at 13–14.
261 Id. at 14.  Boston’s Grammar School Board rejected more integration petitions in
1849. See REPORT OF A SPECIAL COMMITTEE OF THE GRAMMAR SCHOOL BOARD,
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When African Americans in Boston turned to litigation,262 the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court accepted the contention that
racial segregation was in the best interests of both whites and blacks.
The court explained in 1850 that Boston school authorities, “appar-
ently upon great deliberation, have come to the conclusion, that the
good of both classes of schools will be best promoted, by maintaining
the separate primary schools for colored and for white children, and
we can perceive no ground to doubt, that this is the honest result of
their experience and judgment.”263
The Massachusetts legislature prohibited racial segregation in the
state’s public schools in 1855.264  But the claim that segregation was a
shared benefit for blacks and whites, and that integration would harm
both, persisted for over a century.
Southern states advanced mutual benefits arguments in estab-
lishing and maintaining racially segregated public schools after the
Civil War.  The North Carolina constitutional convention of 1868
resolved that “the interests and happiness of the two races would be
best promoted by the establishment of separate schools.”265  The New
Orleans school board took a similar approach in 1877.  It explained
that “its paramount duty” was “to give the best education possible
with the means at its disposal to the whole population, without regard
to race, color or previous condition” and contended “that this end can
be best attained by educating the different races in separate
schools.”266  The United States Circuit Court in Louisiana, which
PRESENTED AUGUST 29, 1849, ON THE PETITION OF SUNDRY COLORED PERSONS, PRAYING
FOR THE ABOLITION OF THE SMITH SCHOOL:  WITH AN APPENDIX 3–7 (Boston, J.H.
Eastburn 1849).  The board endorsed a subcommittee report that stressed its “tender
regard to the best interests” of the city’s African American population, id. at 42–43, and
warned that African American students in racially integrated schools would face both
social ostracism and insurmountable academic competition.  Black children could not
“hope to escape the ‘cold shoulder,’ the petty tyrannies, the slights, rebuffs and insults
from the unfeeling and rude of a different complexion.”  Even if “free fellowship” did
improbably emerge between white and black students, “a poor colored boy” would be
unable to contend academically with “a white lad,—some rich man’s son,” and would
suffer “repinings and chafings and discontents.”  African American parents seeking to inte-
grate Boston’s schools were simply mistaken about their families’ best interests.  “[S]elf-
respect” should “restrain them from forcing their children where they would not be wel-
comed” and where they could not succeed. Id. at 54.
262 See Roberts v. City of Boston, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 198, 204–05 (1850).
263 Id. at 209.
264 See Act of Apr. 28, 1855, ch. 256, § 1, 1855 Mass. Acts 674, 674.
265 CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF NORTH-CAROLINA, TOGETHER WITH THE ORDI-
NANCES AND RESOLUTIONS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, ASSEMBLED IN THE
CITY OF RALEIGH, JAN. 14TH, 1868, at 122 (Raleigh, Joseph W. Holden 1868).
266 Orleans Parish School Board Meeting Minutes 63–64 (July 3, 1877) (on file with
author and the New York University Law Review; University of New Orleans Library).
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upheld the segregation of New Orleans public schools in 1878,267
endorsed the same line of argument.  Judge William B. Woods, who
would join the United States Supreme Court in 1880,268 insisted that
“[t]he state, while conceding equal privileges and advantages to both
races, has the right to manage its schools in the manner which, in its
judgment, will best promote the interest of all.”269
The argument that segregation was a mutual benefit to blacks and
whites expanded its reach in the twentieth century.  In the 1910s, a
wave of cities and towns in southern and border states enacted ordi-
nances requiring residential racial segregation,270 and Virginia passed
legislation expressly authorizing any city or town in that state to do
the same.271  Some of these segregation ordinances focused on main-
taining the uniform racial character of blocks occupied exclusively by
whites or African Americans.272  Other ordinances regulated racially
integrated blocks as well, prohibiting African Americans and whites
from moving onto blocks where members of the other race occupied
the majority of the houses.273
267 See Bertonneau v. Bd. of Dirs. of City Sch., 3 F. Cas. 294, 296 (C.C.D. La. 1878) (No.
1361).
268 See A.H.T., William Burnham Woods, in 10 DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY
505, 506 (Dumas Malone ed., 1936).
269 Bertonneau, 3 F. Cas. at 296; see also Lehew v. Brummell, 15 S.W. 765, 766 (Mo.
1891) (“If we cast aside chimerical theories and look to practical results, it seems to us it
must be conceded that separate schools for colored children is a regulation to their great
advantage.”).
270 See infra notes 272–73 and accompanying text.
271 See Act of Mar. 12, 1912, ch. 157, 1912 Va. Acts 330.
272 See, e.g., Dallas, Tex., Ordinance 195, §§ 1–2 (Aug. 8, 1916) (on file with author and
the New York University Law Review; Dallas Municipal Archives); Okla. City, Okla., Ordi-
nance 1825, §§ 1–2 (Mar. 29, 1916) (on file with author and the New York University Law
Review; City of Oklahoma City); St. Louis, Mo., Ordinance 28,545, §§ 1–2 (Mar. 3, 1916)
(on file with author and the New York University Law Review; St. Louis Public Library);
Atlanta, Ga., An Ordinance for preserving peace, preventing conflict and ill feeling
between the white and colored races and promoting the general welfare of the City by
providing for the use of separate blocks by white and colored people for residences and for
other purposes §§ 1–2 (June 17, 1913) (on file with author and the New York University
Law Review; Atlanta History Center); GREENVILLE, S.C., CODE §§ 570A–570B (1912);
BALT., MD., ORDINANCES 654, §§ 1–2 (1911); see also id. Ordinance 692 (repealing and
reenacting Ordinance 654 to remedy technical problem with enactment).  An earlier
Baltimore ordinance also covered racially integrated blocks. See id. Ordinance 610,
§§ 1–2.  But a Baltimore court struck down this ordinance within a month of its enactment
as “inaccurately drawn.”  W. Ashbie Hawkins, A Year of Segregation in Baltimore, CRISIS,
Nov. 1911, at 27, 29.
273 See, e.g., Louisville, Ky., An Ordinance to Prevent Conflict and Ill-Feeling Between
the White and Colored Races in the City of Louisville and to Preserve the Public Peace
and Promote the General Welfare by Making Reasonable Provisions Requiring, as Far as
Practicable, the Use of Separate Blocks for Residences, Places of Abode and Places of
Assembly by White and Colored People Respectively §§ 1–2 (May 11, 1914) (on file with
author and the New York University Law Review; Louisville City Archives) (capitalization
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Lawmakers consistently justified the residential segregation ordi-
nances, often in their very titles, as advancing the mutual interests of
whites and blacks alike.  Baltimore (in 1911),274 Greenville (1912),275
Atlanta (1913),276 Louisville (1914),277 St. Louis (1916),278 Oklahoma
omitted); Ashland, Va., An Ordinance To Secure for White and Colored People, respec-
tively, the Separate Location of Residences for each Race §§ 1–2 (Sept. 12, 1911) (on file
with author and the New York University Law Review; Town of Ashland) (capitalization
omitted); Clifton Forge, Va., Ordinance §§ 1–2 (June 28, 1911) (on file with author and the
New York University Law Review; Town of Clifton Forge); Richmond, Va., An Ordinance
To secure for white and colored people, respectively, the separate location of residences
for each race §§ 1–2 (Apr. 19, 1911) (on file with author and the New York University Law
Review; University of Virginia Library) (capitalization omitted).  Residential segregation
ordinances in Oklahoma City and St. Louis prohibited African Americans and whites from
moving onto blocks where members of the other race occupied at least seventy-five per-
cent of the houses. See Okla. City, Okla., Ordinance 1824, §§ 1–2 (Mar. 29, 1916) (on file
with author and the New York University Law Review; City of Oklahoma City); St. Louis,
Mo., Ordinance 28,546, §§ 1–2 (Mar. 3, 1916) (on file with author and the New York
University Law Review; St. Louis Public Library).
274 BALT., MD., ORDINANCES 654 (“An ordinance for preserving peace, preventing con-
flict and ill-feeling between the white and colored races in Baltimore city, and promoting
the general welfare of the city by providing, so far as practicable, for the use of separate
blocks by white and colored people for residences, churches and schools.”); see also id.
Ordinance 692 (similar); id. Ordinance 610 (“An ordinance for preserving order, securing
property values and promoting the great interests and insuring the good government of
Baltimore city.”).
275 GREENVILLE, S.C., CODE §§ 570A–570B (“An Ordinance for Preserving Peace,
Preventing Conflict and Ill Feeling between the White and Colored Races in the City of
Greenville, and Promoting the General Welfare of the City by Providing, so far as Practi-
cable for the Use of Separate Blocks for Residences, Churches, Schools, Hotels, Boarding
Houses, Restaurants, Places of Public Amusement, Stores and Places of Business of all
kinds.” (emphasis omitted)).
276 Atlanta, Ga., An Ordinance for preserving peace, preventing conflict and ill feeling
between the white and colored races and promoting the general welfare of the City by
providing for the use of separate blocks by white and colored people for residences and for
other purposes.
277 Louisville, Ky., An Ordinance to Prevent Conflict and Ill-Feeling Between the White
and Colored Races in the City of Louisville and to Preserve the Public Peace and Promote
the General Welfare by Making Reasonable Provisions Requiring, as Far as Practicable,
the Use of Separate Blocks for Residences, Places of Abode and Places of Assembly by
White and Colored People Respectively.
278 St. Louis, Mo., Ordinance 28,546 (“An ordinance to prevent ill feeling, conflict and
collisions between the white and colored races in the City of St. Louis, in the city blocks
occupied by both races, and to preserve the public peace, and promote the general welfare,
by making reasonable provisions whereby gradually such blocks may become in time occu-
pied wholly by either white or colored people, thereby promoting the general welfare of
white and colored people, respectively.”); St. Louis, Mo., Ordinance 28,545 (Mar. 3, 1916)
(on file with author and the New York University Law Review; St. Louis Public Library)
(“An ordinance to prevent ill feeling, conflict and collisions between the white and colored
races in the City of St. Louis, and to preserve the public peace and promote the general
welfare by making reasonable provisions requiring the use of separate blocks for residence
by white and colored people respectively.”).
1518 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84:1464
City (1916),279 and Dallas (1916)280 described their ordinances as mea-
sures for preserving “peace,” preventing “conflict and ill-feeling”
between whites and African Americans, and promoting “the general
welfare.”  Virginia’s 1912 statute authorizing residential segregation
ordinances was similarly for “the preservation of the public morals,
public health and public order.”281
Advocates explained that the ordinances were needed because of
“the ill-effect of a too close commingling of the two races, which is of
ill effect to both, and which seriously interferes with the efforts of civic
and moral uplift and betterment.”282  Requiring residential racial seg-
regation helped both whites and blacks by “furnish[ing] an additional
safeguard to the community from lawlessness and breaches of the
peace, which are the inevitable result of too intimate contact between
the white and negro races.”283  It was “expedient for the best interest
of both races that they shall live in distinct sections of the cities where
such ordinances have been enacted.”284
Indeed, defenders of residential segregation ordinances insisted
that if the ordinances disproportionately burdened any group, it was
whites, who were more likely to own houses and thus more likely to
have their property rights limited by legal restrictions on occu-
pancy.285  In contrast, blacks purportedly benefited most from these
279 Okla. City, Okla., Ordinance 1825 (Mar. 29, 1916) (on file with author and the New
York University Law Review; City of Oklahoma City) (“An ordinance to prevent ill
feeling, conflict and collisions between the white and colored races in the city of Oklahoma
City, Okla. and to preserve the public peace and promote the general welfare by making
reasonable provisions requiring the use of separate blocks for residence by white and
colored people respectively, and declaring an emergency.” (capitalization omitted)); Okla.
City, Okla., Ordinance 1824 (Mar. 29, 1916) (on file with author and the New York
University Law Review; City of Oklahoma City) (“An ordinance to prevent ill feeling,
conflict and collisions between the white and colored races in the city of Oklahoma City,
Okla., in the city blocks occupied by both races and to preserve the public peace, and
promote the general welfare, by making reasonable provisions whereby gradually such
blocks may become in time occupied wholly by either white or colored people, thereby
promoting the general welfare of white and colored people, respectively, and declaring an
emergency.” (capitalization omitted)).
280 Dallas, Tex., Ordinance 195 (Aug. 8, 1916) (on file with author and the New York
University Law Review; Dallas Municipal Archives) (“An ordinance for preserving peace,
preventing conflict and ill feeling between the white and colored races by providing for the
use of separate blocks by white and colored people for residences and for other purposes,
prescribing a penalty and declaring an emergency.” (capitalization omitted)).
281 Act of Mar. 12, 1912, ch. 157, 1912 Va. Acts 330, 330.
282 T.B. Benson, Segregation Ordinances, 1 VA. L. REG. (n.s.) 330, 330 (1915).
283 Brief for Defendant in Error at 22–23, Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917) (No.
33).
284 James F. Minor, Constitutionality of Segregation Ordinances, 18 VA. L. REG. 561, 561
(1912).
285 See State v. Gurry, 88 A. 546, 551 (Md. 1913); Benson, supra note 282, at 335; see
also Minor, supra note 284, at 574–75.
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ordinances because they would supposedly suffer most if residential
segregation were not legally mandated.  This argument drew on the
strength of racial prejudice as a reason to accommodate and legalize
that prejudice.  For instance, Louisville contended that “[t]he alterna-
tive to” the type of ordinance it enacted “seems unfortunately to be
those extra-legal or positively illegal methods which only too many
communities, North and South, have employed to prevent the negro
from living among them, and where, instead of giving him a fair and
equal chance, have forced the negro at the point of a shotgun to move
on.”286
African Americans and their advocates vigorously contested the
claim that residential segregation ordinances benefited whites and
blacks alike, or even favored blacks.  They condemned the ordinances
as blatant efforts to enforce white supremacy.  African American
opponents of St. Louis’s ordinances, which were enacted by popular
vote,287 distributed pamphlets entitled Negro Segregation:  A Measure
To Assassinate a Race288 and cartoons captioned “‘Back to slavery’”
that depicted a white man whipping a black man.289  The NAACP,
which sued challenging Louisville’s ordinance,290 noted that “[n]o one
286 Brief for Defendant in Error, supra note 283, at 119.
287 See Roger N. Baldwin, Negro Segregation by Initiative Election in St. Louis, 14 AM.
CITY 356, 356 (1916) (“The first popular vote by use of the initiative under the new St.
Louis city charter, and the first popular vote in the United States on negro segregation,
resulted in adopting the segregation ordinance by a three-to-one vote on February 29.  Sev-
enty thousand voters, one-half of the total registered, cast their ballots.  Of the eighteen
thousand votes cast against segregation, about nine thousand were those of negroes.  The
only white wards which voted against it were two in the downtown district inhabited by
citizens of foreign birth.”).
288 GEO. E. STEVENS, NEGRO SEGREGATION:  A MEASURE TO ASSASSINATE A RACE IN
ST. LOUIS, MO. (FALL OF 1915) A STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES A REVIEW OF RACE RELA-
TIONS AND A PROTEST (1915); see also id. at 1 (“This statement of principles was adopted
and ordered published Aug. 2, 1915, by the Antioch Baptist Association, of St. Louis. Mo.,
representing ten thousand Negro citizens.”).
289 Negro-Segregation in St. Louis, LITERARY DIG., Mar. 18, 1916, at 702, 702.
290 Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917), was a test case that the NAACP arranged
and litigated.  Six months after Louisville enacted its residential segregation ordinance,
William Warley, the African American president of the NAACP’s Louisville branch, con-
tracted to buy a plot of land from Charles Buchanan, a white real estate agent who had
agreed to cooperate with the NAACP. See C.H. PARRISH ET AL., LEGAL COMM.,
N.A.A.C.P., THE HISTORY OF LOUISVILLE SEGREGATION CASE AND THE DECISION OF
THE SUPREME COURT 3 (n.d.); C.B. Blakey, History by Attorney Blakey, in id. at 10, 10–11;
Roger L. Rice, Residential Segregation by Law, 1910–1917, 34 J.S. HIST. 179, 185–86
(1968).  The land was on a block in Louisville where whites occupied most of the houses,
and the contract specified that Warley did not have to go through with the purchase agree-
ment if the laws of Kentucky and Louisville prohibited him from occupying a house on the
land.  Buchanan tendered the deed, and Warley refused to accept it or to pay for the land
on the ground that Louisville’s residential segregation ordinance barred him from moving
onto the block.  Buchanan then sued to challenge the constitutionality of Louisville’s ordi-
nance. See Brief for the Plaintiff in Error on Rehearing at 1–2, 7, Buchanan, 245 U.S. 60
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outside a court room would imagine for an instant that the predomi-
nant purpose of this ordinance was not to prevent the negro citizens of
Louisville, however industrious, thrifty and well-educated they might
be, from approaching that condition vaguely described as ‘social
equality.’”291
However, several state courts in the 1910s insisted that African
Americans opposing residential segregation ordinances misunder-
stood their own best interests.  These courts endorsed the claim that
residential segregation operated to the mutual benefit of blacks and
whites.  Their opinions dismissed the notion that segregation ordi-
nances promoted racial conflict by enforcing racial subordination.
Instead, courts asserted that residential segregation avoided racial
conflict through racial separation, and maintained that both blacks
and whites would benefit from the resulting racial peace.  The
Kentucky Court of Appeals, which upheld Louisville’s ordinance,292
denied that legally required racial segregation imposed any “stigma.”
To the contrary, legalized racial segregation, including Louisville’s
ordinance, was enacted “in order to prevent such conflicts as are
shown by this record to have resulted in Louisville from the racial
discord consequent upon the close association of the races, and in
order that the solidarity of the races may be preserved, and, finally,
that in a spirit of mutual helpfulness and racial friendship each race
may attain those heights of human development which are its to be
won, and may aid in bringing to this state and nation of ours all that
the undreamed future has in store for us.”293  The Georgia Supreme
(No. 33); Brief for the Plaintiff in Error at 1–2, 7, Buchanan, 245 U.S. 60 (No. 33).
Buchanan’s lawyers included Moorfield Storey, the NAACP’s first president. See Brief for
the Plaintiff in Error on Rehearing, supra, at 47; Brief for the Plaintiff in Error, supra, at
33; WILLIAM B. HIXSON, JR., MOORFIELD STOREY AND THE ABOLITIONIST TRADITION
98–99, 139–42 (1972).  Warley invited Louisville’s city attorneys to represent him so that
they could defend the city’s ordinance. See Brief for Defendant in Error, supra note 283,
at 1.
291 Brief for the Plaintiff in Error on Rehearing, supra note 290, at 17; see also Brief for
the Plaintiff in Error, supra note 290, at 32 (similar).  “The ordinance was manifestly drawn
with great ingenuity in order to place the negro citizens of Louisville in as inferior a posi-
tion as possible with respect to their right of residence and to violate the spirit of the
Fourteenth Amendment without transgressing the letter.  If one of those who enacted the
ordinance were defending his course before his constituents, he would ask their approval
just because he had succeeded so well in establishing a permanent superiority for the white
race.”  Brief for the Plaintiff in Error on Rehearing, supra note 290, at 23; see also Brief for
the Plaintiff in Error, supra note 290, at 33 (similar).
292 See Harris v. City of Louisville, 177 S.W. 472, 477 (Ky. 1915), rev’d sub nom.
Buchanan, 245 U.S. 60.
293 Id.
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Court, which upheld an Atlanta segregation ordinance,294 similarly
contended that “[s]egregation is not imposed as a stigma upon either
race, but in order to uphold the integrity of each race and to prevent
conflicts between them resulting from close association.”295
Ultimately, the United States Supreme Court rejected the mutual
benefits argument as a justification for legally required residential
racial segregation.  In 1917, the Court struck down Louisville’s segre-
gation ordinance.296  The Court agreed that “the preservation of the
public peace” was “important” and “[d]esirable,” but explained that
“this aim cannot be accomplished by laws or ordinances which deny
rights created or protected by the Federal Constitution.”297  Nonethe-
less, the contention that racial segregation was a mutual benefit to
whites and blacks, and that racial integration would be a shared
calamity, remained vibrant.  Segregationists emphasized mutual bene-
fits discourse over the next decades when African Americans and
their allies attempted to secure new forms of racial equality.298
294 See Harden v. City of Atlanta, 93 S.E. 401, 403 (Ga. 1917), overruled by Glover v.
City of Atlanta, 96 S.E. 562, 562–63 (Ga. 1918) (per curiam) (striking down Atlanta ordi-
nance after United States Supreme Court’s Buchanan decision).
295 Id. at 402–03.  The Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals upheld residential segrega-
tion ordinances from Richmond and Ashland, Virginia. See Hopkins v. City of Richmond,
86 S.E. 139, 141 (Va. 1915) (per curiam), overruled by Irvine v. City of Clifton Forge, 97
S.E. 310, 310 (Va. 1918) (relying on Buchanan).  The court explained that the ordinances
were designed “‘to prevent too close association of the races, which association results, or
tends to result, in breaches of peace, immorality, and danger to the health.’” Id. at 144
(quoting Town of Ashland v. Coleman, 19 VA. L. REG. 427, 437 (Cir. Ct. Hanover County
1913)).  The Maryland Court of Appeals struck down Baltimore’s segregation ordinance
because it applied retrospectively as well as prospectively:  People who owned homes at
the time of the ordinance’s enactment could be barred from occupying them under the
ordinance’s rules. See State v. Gurry, 88 A. 546, 552–53 (Md. 1913).  But the court noted
that “[n]o intelligent observer in communities where there are many colored people can
fail to notice that there are sometimes exhibitions of feelings between members of the two
races which are likely to, and occasionally do, result in outbreaks of violence and dis-
order.”  “[I]f a segregation of the races to such extent as may be permissible under the
Constitution and laws of the land will have a tendency, not only to avoid disorder and
violence, but to make a better feeling between the races, every one having the interests of
the colored people as well as of the white people at heart ought to encourage rather than
oppose it.” Id. at 551.  The court decided Gurry on October 7, 1913. See id. at 546.  On
September 25, 1913, Baltimore had enacted a new residential segregation ordinance that
applied prospectively only. See BALT., MD., ORDINANCES 339, § 1 (1914) (“An ordinance
to prevent conflict and ill-feeling between the white and colored races in Baltimore City,
and to preserve the public peace and promote the general welfare by making reasonable
provisions requiring the use of separate blocks for residences by white and colored people,
respectively.”).  The Maryland Court of Appeals struck this ordinance down in 1918. See
Jackson v. State, 103 A. 910, 910–11 (Md. 1918) (relying on Buchanan).
296 See Buchanan, 245 U.S. at 81–82.
297 Id. at 81.
298 For instance, Supreme Court Justice James McReynolds, who opposed integrating
the University of Missouri School of Law, warned in 1938 that “break[ing] down the set-
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The claim that legalized racial segregation operated to the mutual
advantage of whites and blacks reached a fever pitch in the defense of
racially segregated public education that southern states mounted in
the consolidated cases that became Brown v. Board of Education
(1954).299  With civil rights arguments ascendant and Jim Crow’s
future at stake, South Carolina insisted that it was intent on producing
“equality for all of its children of whatever race or color” and “con-
vinced that the happiness, the progress and the welfare of these chil-
dren [was] best promoted in segregated schools.”300  Virginia
contended that its eighty years of racial segregation in public educa-
tion had caused “no hurt or harm to either race.”301  Instead, the state
asserted, “segregation by race in Virginia’s public schools . . . not only
does not offend the Constitution of the United States but serves to
provide a better education for living for the children of both races.”302
tled practice concerning separate schools” would “thereby, as indicated by experience,
damnify both races.”  Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 353 (1938)
(McReynolds, J., dissenting).  The Alabama legislature passed a joint resolution in 1943
urging Alabama’s United States Senators to oppose a federal bill abolishing poll taxes. See
S.J. Res. 42, No. 154, 1943 Ala. Laws 139, 139–40.  The resolution identified the proposed
federal legislation, rather than the virtually complete disenfranchisement of African
Americans in the South, as the source of racial conflict.  It explained that “throughout the
years since Reconstruction there has been an amicable and friendly relationship between
the two races in the South, and the continuous agitation from outside sources is creating
bitterness and hostility, greatly to the detriment of our people, both white and black, . . .
and is preventing the orderly solution of our problems in a manner assuring lasting justice
to both races.” Id. at 139.  Kansas City, Missouri, contended in 1952 that segregation of
the city’s public swimming pools “preserve[d] peace and order in the community for the
protection and welfare of both races,” Williams v. Kansas City, Mo., 104 F. Supp. 848, 852
(W.D. Mo. 1952), aff’d, 205 F.2d 47 (8th Cir. 1953), and warned that integrating the pools
“would produce a condition detrimental to the best interests of both races,” id. at 853.
299 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
300 Transcript of Oral Reargument in Briggs v. Elliott and Davis v. County School Board
(Dec. 7, 1953), in 49A LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE UNITED STATES:  CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 447, 492 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard
Casper eds., 1975) (argument of John W. Davis on behalf of appellees).
301 Transcript of Oral Argument in Davis v. County School Board (Dec. 10, 1952), in 49
LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES:
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 300, at 347, 367 (argument of T. Justin Moore on behalf
of appellees).
302 Brief for Appellees on Reargument at 82–83, Davis v. County School Board, 347
U.S. 483 (1954) (No. 4).  Virginia did not have much evidence from African Americans to
support this proposition, but it included the testimony of the state’s white superintendent
of public instruction, who reported “‘that the customs and the habits and the traditions of
Virginia citizens are such that they believe for the best interests of both the white and the
Negro that the separate school is best.’” Id. at 70 (quoting Dowell Howard, Virginia
Superintendent of Public Instruction).  Colgate Darden, president of the University of
Virginia and former Virginia governor, added that “‘the races separated, if given a fairly
good opportunity, are better off.’” Id. (quoting Colgate Darden).  In the companion case
to Brown that challenged segregation in Washington, D.C.’s public schools, see Bolling v.
Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 498 (1954), the city similarly maintained that integrated classrooms
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The civil rights movement that developed over the course of the
twentieth century directly countered these mutual benefits arguments.
Civil rights advocates repeatedly emphasized how racial segregation
harmed African Americans, reflecting and reinforcing their confine-
ment to a subordinated position in American society.  As early as
1935, Chas. H. Thompson, Professor of Education at Howard
University, condemned as “sheer sophistry” the argument “that
Negroes are no more stigmatized by the separate school than white
people who are also segregated.”  “For we all know that segregation is
practically always initiated by the whites, and initiated on the basis
that Negroes are inferior and undesirable.”303  Thurgood Marshall, the
plaintiffs’ lead lawyer in Brown, argued before the Court that the
white South’s defense of racially segregated public education reduced
to two points:  “one, that they got together and decided that it is best
for the races to be separated, and, two, that it has existed for over a
century.  Neither argument, to my mind, is any good.”304  Other civil
rights supporters similarly attacked the claim “that segregation is
‘better’ for the Negroes, is not intended to hurt them,” explaining that
“a little probing would demonstrate that what is meant is that it is
better for the Negroes to accept a position of inferiority, at least for
the indefinite future.”305
The Supreme Court in Brown soundly rejected arguments that
legalized racial segregation advanced the mutual interests of blacks
and whites. Brown held that racially segregated public education
could never be constitutional,306 in an opinion that detailed the harms
that segregation inflicted on African American children.  The Court
explained that “[t]o separate [African American children] from others
were likely to foster a “hostile atmosphere” that would “harm the ability to learn of both
the races,” Transcript of Oral Argument in Bolling v. Sharpe (Dec. 10, 1952), in 49
LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES:
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 300, at 395, 429 (argument of Milton D. Korman on
behalf of respondents).  The city contended that white and African American children
were both better off with “completely adequate, separate, full educational opportunities on
both sides, where they will be instructed on the white side by white teachers, who are
sympathetic to them, and on the colored side by colored teachers, who are sympathetic to
them, and where they will receive from the lips of their own people education in colored
folklore, which is important to a people.” Id. at 429–30.
303 Chas. H. Thompson, Court Action the Only Reasonable Alternative To Remedy
Immediate Abuses of the Negro Separate School, 4 J. NEGRO EDUC. 419, 433 (1935).
304 Transcript of Oral Reargument in Briggs v. Elliott and Davis v. County School Board
(Dec. 8, 1953), in 49A LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE UNITED STATES:  CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 300, at 501, 516 (rebuttal argu-
ment of Thurgood Marshall on behalf of appellants).
305 Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421,
424 (1960).
306 See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
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of similar age and qualifications solely because of their race generates
a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may
affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone.”307
But even after Brown, legal advocates and authorities commonly
contended that public institutions should not integrate because racial
segregation benefited both blacks and whites.  This argument still con-
vinced segregationists, or they still thought that the claim resonated
with constituencies outside the Supreme Court, or both.  When segre-
gationists needed to present their last, best case for preserving Jim
Crow despite the mounting successes of the civil rights movement,
they turned to mutual benefits arguments.
James Eastland, a United States senator from Mississippi,
declared in the days after the Court’s decision that “the vast majority
of the members of both of the races in the South” supported segrega-
tion because it “promotes racial harmony” and “permits each race to
follow its own pursuits, to develop its own culture, its own institutions,
and its own civilization.”308  “Everyone knows,” Eastland asserted,
“that the school atmosphere, the tension, and frictions generated in
interracial schools will have a detrimental effect upon the children of
both races, will lessen their ability to learn, and will retard the pro-
gress of education.”309  “[W]ithout the intervention of northern med-
dlers, segregated schools would continue by mutual agreement of the
leaders of both races.”310
A few months after Brown, Virginia Governor Thomas Stanley
appointed thirty-two members of the Virginia General Assembly to a
commission charged with recommending how the state should
307 Id. at 494.
308 100 CONG. REC. 7255 (1954) (statement of Senator James Eastland).
309 Id. at 7252.
310 Id. at 7257; see also TOM P. BRADY, BLACK MONDAY 65 (1955) (“[Segregation is]
the greatest factor for peace and harmony between the races.”); Hazel Brannon Smith,
Through Hazel Eyes, LEXINGTON ADVERTISER (Lexington, Miss.), May 20, 1954, at 1
(“We know that it is to the best interest of both races that segregation be maintained in
theory and in fact—and that where it isn’t maintained trouble results.”); We Are Not
Acquiescent, JACKSON DAILY NEWS (Jackson, Miss.), May 23, 1954, at 10 (“One deplorable
result of the [Brown] decision is that it will halt the steady improvement in educational
facilities under way in all Southern states and thus the Negro race will suffer, instead of
benefitting, from the court ruling.  It inevitably means a lessening of friendly interest in
Negro education among school officials and the public generally.  The decree is a blow
instead of a benefit to the Negro race.”); id. (“[T]he thinking people of neither race want
the abandonment of segregation[.]  Radicals and rabble-rousers and race agitators are in
great glee of course but all persons in both races who use their heads for something other
than loafing places for hair well realize the gravity of the situation and the tragic conse-
quences to which it may lead.”).
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respond to the Supreme Court decision.311  The commission con-
cluded in 1955 “that separate facilities in our public schools are in the
best interest of both races, educationally and otherwise, and that com-
pulsory integration should be resisted by all proper means in our
power.”312  Governor Stanley agreed “that the best interest of both
white and Negro races will be served by continued separation in the
public schools.”313  He proposed legislation in August 1956 to enforce
and perpetuate the segregation of Virginia’s public schools,314
explaining that the legislation was “designed to promote the best
interests of all Virginians, white and Negro, and especially the welfare
of the greatest asset of any people, the boys and girls who constitute
our future citizenship.”315  One month later, the Virginia “General
Assembly, for the purpose of protecting the health and welfare of the
people and in order to preserve and maintain an efficient system of
public elementary and secondary schools,”316 enacted a statute that
cut off state funding for all public elementary schools in a county, city,
or town if any of the locality’s public elementary schools integrated
and that cut off state funding for all public secondary schools in a
county, city, or town if any of the locality’s public secondary schools
integrated.317
Jackson, Mississippi, Mayor Allen Thompson, testifying in 1961 to
defend the segregation of the city’s public transportation facilities,318
explained that Jackson’s policy of racial segregation had “‘worked
311 See PUBLIC EDUCATION:  REPORT OF THE COMMISSION TO THE GOVERNOR OF
VIRGINIA, S. DOC. NO. 1, at 5 (1955); Thos. B. Stanley, Address of Thos. B. Stanley
Governor to the General Assembly Extra Session Monday, August 27, 1956, in
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA:  INAUGURAL ADDRESS AND ADDRESSES DELIVERED TO
THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF VIRGINIA BY THOS. B. STANLEY 1954–1958, at 3, 3.
312 PUBLIC EDUCATION:  REPORT OF THE COMMISSION TO THE GOVERNOR OF
VIRGINIA, supra note 311, at 7.
313 Stanley, supra note 311, at 4.
314 See id. at 5–7.
315 Id. at 8.
316 Act of Sept. 29, 1956, ch. 71, § 1, 1956 Extra Sess. Va. Acts 78, 106 (emphasis
omitted).
317 See id. at 107.  For a Virginia school district that anticipated the legislature’s lan-
guage, see Surry Officials Strongly Favor Present County School System, SUSSEX-SURRY
DISPATCH (Waverly, Va.), July 1, 1954, at 1 (“[T]he Board of Supervisors of Surry County
and the County School Board on [June 30 resolved] . . . . ‘That it is our considered judg-
ment that the best interest of public education for both the White and Negro children in
Surry County, and the only way to maintain an efficient system of public education as
required by the Constitution of Virginia, is through the continuation of a segregated school
system; and to that end we express our unalterable opposition to integration of the races in
the public schools to any degree, now or at any time in the future, and pledge to the people
of this County our best efforts to continue our present educational system.’”).
318 See Bailey v. Patterson, 199 F. Supp. 595, 610–11 (S.D. Miss. 1961) (Rives, J., dis-
senting), vacated and remanded, 369 U.S. 31 (1962) (per curiam).
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over the last hundred years to bring happiness and peace and pros-
perity to everyone within our city.’”  Thompson insisted that segrega-
tion was “‘agreeable to both the white and the colored.’”  It
“‘maintain[ed] happiness and contentment between the races, within
the law, and at the same time [gave] the benefit of the great advantage
over the years of living together in peace and quiet.’”319  Thompson
and W.D. Rayfield, Jackson’s chief of police, contended in a 1963 suit
that the city posted “racial signs” outside rail and bus “terminals
because ‘it is for the best interest of all of the citizens of the City of
Jackson that the races be encouraged to separate voluntarily in order
to promote the peace, harmony and health of all the citizens of
Jackson.’”320
More strikingly, some lower courts continued to accept claims
that racial segregation benefited both blacks and whites as adequate
justification for maintaining segregation notwithstanding Brown.
These courts insisted that African Americans seeking to enforce
Brown’s mandates misunderstood their own best interests.  Judge
Frank Scarlett of the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Georgia held in 1963 that Savannah-Chatham County did
not have to desegregate its public schools because “pupils of both
races in Savannah-Chatham County are entitled to the best education
available and on the unassailable facts that education is best given in
separate schools adapted to their varying abilities.”321  This argument
drew on the long white supremacist tradition asserting the innate
intellectual superiority of whites over blacks.  The court found that
“differences in test results between the white and Negro students”
were “attributable in large part to hereditary factors, predictably
resulting from a difference in the physiological and psychological
characteristics of the two races.”  “Substantially all the difference
between these two groups of children” was “inherent.”322  The court
concluded that integrating African American and white children into
the same classrooms “would seriously injure both white and Negro
319 Id. at 611 (quoting Allen Thompson, mayor of Jackson, Mississippi).
320 United States v. City of Jackson, Miss., 318 F.2d 1, 6 n.9 (5th Cir. 1963) (quoting
“affidavits of both Mayor Thompson and Chief of Police Rayfield”).  Clarendon County,
South Carolina, advanced a mutual benefits argument in 1965 to explain why the county
had yet to integrate its public schools, despite having been one of the losing defendants in
Brown. See Brunson v. Bd. of Trs. of Sch. Dist. No. 1, 244 F. Supp. 859, 859–60 & n.2
(E.D.S.C. 1965).  Clarendon “contend[ed] that the maintenance of segregated public
schools is in the best interest of pupils of both races,” id. at 862, and “assert[ed] that such a
system is maintained in accordance with the wishes and desires of the great majority of
parents of both races living within the District,” id. at 860.
321 Stell v. Savannah-Chatham County Bd. of Educ., 220 F. Supp. 667, 682 (S.D. Ga.
1963), rev’d, 333 F.2d 55 (5th Cir. 1964).
322 Id. at 683.
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students in the Savannah-Chatham County schools and adversely
affect the educational standards and accomplishments of the public
school system.”323  “White students in such a class” would “lose any
challenge to further academic accomplishment.”  “Failure to attain the
existing white standards would create serious psychological problems
of frustration on the part of the Negro child, which would require
compensation by attention-creating antisocial behavior.”324
The Fifth Circuit reversed Judge Scarlett in June 1964.  The
appellate court cited the controlling Brown precedent,325 and disputed
the contention that white and black students were both better off in
segregated schools because of supposed intellectual differences
between the two groups.326
Nonetheless, just a few weeks after this Fifth Circuit decision,
Judge Sidney Mize of the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Mississippi found that Jackson, Mississippi, had
proven its contention that its segregated public schools operated “for
the benefit and best interest of all pupils of the District.”327  Here
again, the district court maintained that African Americans seeking
integration misunderstood their own interests.  The court’s argument
started from the premise “that white and Negro pupils of public
school age have substantially different educational aptitudes and
learning patterns which are innate in character.”328  On this theory,
segregated schools were needed “if equal educational opportunity
[was] to be made available to the children of both races.”329
“[S]eparate classes allow[ed] greater adaptation to the differing edu-
cational traits of Negro and white pupils, and actually result[ed] in
323 Id. at 684.
324 Id. at 683.
325 See Stell, 333 F.2d at 61 (“We reiterate that no inferior federal court may refrain
from acting as required by [Brown] even if such a court should conclude that the Supreme
Court erred either as to its facts or as to the law.”).
326 The Fifth Circuit explained that “[t]he real fallacy, Constitution-wise, of the classifi-
cation theory is that many of the Negro pupils overlap many of the white pupils in achieve-
ment and aptitude but are nevertheless to be segregated on the basis of race.  They are to
be separated, regardless of how great their ability as individuals, into schools with mem-
bers of their own race because of the differences in test averages as between the races.
Therein is the discrimination.  The individual Negro student is not to be treated as an
individual and allowed to proceed along with other individuals on the basis of ability alone
without regard to race.” Id. at 62.
327 Evers v. Jackson Mun. Separate Sch. Dist., 232 F. Supp. 241, 242 (S.D. Miss. 1964).
328 Id. at 248; see also id. at 251 (“[P]laintiffs have conceded, by their unwillingness or
inability to contest the issues of which they had been seasonably informed, . . . that differ-
ences between Caucasians and Negroes are genetically determined and cannot be changed
materially by environment . . . .”).
329 Id. at 248.
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greater scholastic accomplishments for both.”330  Judge Mize warned
that integration would be disastrous for white and black students
alike, “substantially destroy[ing] the present levels of academic
achievement in the school district.”331  Moreover, Mize contended
that the harm would fall hardest on African Americans, who “would
be driven to compensate for their comparative shortcomings” in inte-
grated classrooms “either by rationalization in the form of discrediting
educational values and dropping out of school, or by substitution of
diversionary, attention-seeking delinquent behavior.”332  Mize ulti-
mately conceded that “the obvious holding of the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit” required him to obey Brown.  But
Mize stressed that “the facts in this case point up a most serious situa-
tion, and, indeed, ‘cry out’ for a reappraisal and complete reconsidera-
tion of the findings and conclusions of the United States Supreme
Court in the Brown decision, as interpreted by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.”333
Legalized racial segregation was a pivotal means of maintaining,
promoting, and enforcing white supremacy in the wake of slavery’s
abolition.  But for over a century before Brown, and a decade after,
legal authorities and advocates commonly contended that racial segre-
gation benefited blacks and whites alike, warned that racial integra-
tion would be disastrous for both, and insisted that African Americans
challenging segregation did not recognize their own best interests.
V
EVALUATING MUTUAL BENEFITS ARGUMENTS
As we have seen, mutual benefits arguments have been remark-
ably resilient across substantive contexts and over time.  These argu-
ments insist that women and people of color seeking greater rights
and opportunities misunderstand their own interests and fail to realize
that more prerogatives and choices will harm them or have harmed
them already.  Proponents contend that limiting the rights and oppor-
tunities available to women and people of color helps everyone.
Mutual benefits discourse offers the tempting promise that legal deci-
sionmakers do not have to choose between conflicting views and
opposing sides because all parties share aligned interests.
The record this Article presents richly illustrates how mutual ben-
efits claims have historically operated to rationalize, reinforce, and
330 Id. at 249.
331 Id. at 252.
332 Id. at 249.
333 Id. at 255.
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perpetuate inequalities based on sex and race that are now widely
denounced.  Arguments that rights and opportunities would harm
their supposed beneficiaries were central to the defenses of slavery,
racial segregation, common law coverture, and legal restraints on
women’s ability to participate in market work.
The fact that historical expressions of mutual benefits discourse
are no longer convincing does not necessarily mean that modern
examples of this discourse are also unconvincing.  But the prominent
place that mutual benefits arguments assumed in supporting now-
repudiated manifestations of sex and race inequality creates reason
for caution in evaluating contemporary mutual benefits claims.
Modern mutual benefits arguments invoke deep-seated ways of rea-
soning about women and people of color, and an established tradition
of arguments asserting that both groups are better off with fewer
rights and opportunities.  The long record and historical resonance of
mutual benefits discourse may explain why courts, legislatures, and
commentators are primed to accept mutual benefits claims with so
little debate, deliberation, evidence, or investigation.  Yet mutual ben-
efits arguments, for all their cultural familiarity, were historically
deployed in support of practices that virtually no one would still
defend.
I would like to encourage more careful examination of arguments
too quickly accepted as persuasive or even commonsensical.  This Part
draws on the reasons why historical mutual benefits arguments are
unconvincing to propose four practical criteria that legal authorities
and commentators should use in assessing contemporary mutual bene-
fits discourse.  These criteria consider whether advocates advancing a
mutual benefits argument are consistent in their claims, whether they
present evidence that rights and opportunities will harm or have
harmed their intended beneficiaries, whether they depend upon
narrow assumptions about how women and people of color should act,
and whether they respond to counterarguments and opposing
perspectives.
I apply the criteria to several concrete contexts—marital rape,
abortion, and affirmative action—in which judges, legislators, and
commentators are contending that women and people of color are
better off without rights and opportunities.  The criteria offer useful
guidance in evaluating arguments that risk shielding sex and race ine-
quality.  As this Part demonstrates, mutual benefits arguments tend to
share a constellation of common flaws.
The first criteria concerns consistency.  It asks whether deci-
sionmakers and advocates insisting that rights and opportunities will
harm women or people of color express similar misgivings about com-
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parable rights and opportunities for other groups, or assume instead
that women and people of color are unusually poor decisionmakers.
There is good cause to be wary of arguments that people pursuing
rights and opportunities misunderstand their own interests when those
arguments are applied disproportionately to groups long without
equal status, or any status, in the legal system and long assumed to
have lesser reasoning capacity simply by virtue of their status.  As we
have seen, the law has long presumed that women are inherently
incompetent decisionmakers.  Coverture’s defenders insisted that
women were unable to make choices in their best interests,334 while
empowering men to manage everyone’s affairs.335  Supporters of
women-only protective labor legislation stressed that women could
not reach reasonable judgments about working outside the home,336 at
the same time that Lochner constitutionalized a presumption of male
autonomy and self-sufficiency.337  A similarly lengthy legal tradition
contended that African Americans were innately inferior to whites
intellectually or even (in the antebellum version of this argument)
entirely incapable of self-government.  This account presupposed
white competence, while maintaining that blacks were unable to
assess their own best interests in deciding where to work, live, or send
their children to school.338
Contemporary judges, legislators, and commentators have also
been extremely selective in contending that denying rights and oppor-
tunities benefits everyone, including the people seeking rights and
opportunities.  Lawmakers and advocates frequently rely on the pro-
position that limits on women’s rights advance women’s own interests
by preventing women from making the self-defeating choices they
would pursue with more freedom.  This claim, which was central to
the historical defenses of common law coverture and women-only pro-
tective labor legislation,339 remains pivotal in contemporary argu-
ments for marital rape exemptions and antiabortion laws.340  But
authorities and advocates do not generally cite the concern that rights
will leave the rights holders worse off as a reason to deny equal treat-
ment under the law (coverture and women-only protective labor legis-
lation), or full protection from behavior that is usually criminalized
334 See supra text accompanying notes 169–71.
335 See supra text accompanying note 157.
336 See supra text accompanying notes 201–12.
337 See supra text accompanying notes 179–81.
338 See supra text accompanying notes 230–33, 321–33.
339 See supra Part III.
340 See supra Part I.
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(marital rape exemptions), or access to the safest medical procedures
(the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act).
Similarly, the Supreme Court has increasingly embraced the argu-
ment that race-based affirmative action programs must be constitu-
tionally limited and then eliminated in order to protect people of color
from the injuries that affirmative action would otherwise inflict upon
them.341  Yet the legal system does not usually assume that people
attempting to improve their opportunities are fundamentally confused
about how to advance their interests, will be harmed if they establish
their claims, and need to be protected from themselves.  For instance,
lawmakers do not reason in those terms in making judgments about
what are probably the most important and far-reaching affirmative
action programs in the United States, the employment preferences
that the federal government and almost all the states grant to vet-
erans,342 who are overwhelmingly male and also largely white.343  To
my knowledge, there is no suggestion in the legislation creating these
preferences, or in the judicial opinions upholding them, that veterans’
preferences should be restricted or eradicated in order to protect vet-
erans from harm.  Instead, legislators and judges assume that veterans
can assess their own interests, and accept veterans’ statements that
they will benefit from these preferences.344
The second criteria focuses on evidence of harm.  It asks whether
arguments asserting that women and people of color will be better off
with fewer rights and opportunities present evidence that a right or
opportunity will harm women or people of color, or has harmed them
already.  If such evidence exists, moreover, how reliable is it?  Warn-
ings of injury are far less convincing when they do not have data, or
dependable data, behind them.  For example, the historical defenders
of women’s legalized inequality, slavery, and segregation were full of
341 See supra Part II.
342 See, e.g., 38 U.S.C. § 4214(a)(1) (2006) (“It is . . . the policy of the United States and
the purpose of this section to promote the maximum of employment and job advancement
opportunities within the Federal Government for qualified covered veterans . . . who are
qualified for such employment and advancement.”); Pers. Adm’r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256,
261 & nn.6–7 (1979); U.S. OFFICE OF PERS. MGMT., REPORT TO THE CONGRESS:  THE
EMPLOYMENT OF VETERANS IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT FISCAL YEAR 2007, at 6 &
tbl.1 (2008) (reporting that veterans entitled to veterans’ preferences constituted 22.9% of
the federal non-postal workforce in fiscal year 2007).
343 See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF
THE UNITED STATES:  2009, at 333 tbl.504 (2008) (reporting that 92.99% of veterans were
male and 84.66% of veterans were white in 2006).
344 See, e.g., Feeney, 442 U.S. at 265 (veterans’ preferences “reward veterans for the
sacrifice of military service,” “ease the transition from military to civilian life,” “encourage
patriotic service,” and “attract loyal and well-disciplined people to civil service occupa-
tions”); id. at 277 (veterans’ preferences give veterans “a competitive headstart”).
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dire predictions about the consequences of granting women and
people of color more rights and opportunities, but extremely short on
reliable evidence to back their claims.  They offered little more than
assumptions and assertions to support their warnings that married
women empowered to contract would enter ruinous bargains;345 or
that emancipation would leave African Americans indolent, crimi-
nally inclined, and vulnerable to violent retribution;346 or that black
children would not be able to learn effectively in racially integrated
schools.347
The evidence of harm supporting contemporary mutual benefits
arguments is sometimes questionably reliable, and sometimes simply
nonexistent.  By far the largest body of evidence exists in the abortion
context.  The antiabortion movement has collected and disseminated
thousands of affidavits from women reporting that their abortions
injured them psychologically and that they regret having abortions.
For instance, an antiabortion group included some of these affidavits
in an amicus brief that the Carhart Court cited to support its decision
upholding the prohibition of an abortion procedure.348  There is no
reason to doubt that some women do regret their abortions and suffer
psychologically after them.  But there is reason to be wary of evidence
that advocacy groups have compiled in the interest of affecting litiga-
tion and legislation.  In fact, scientific and medical studies consistently
find that women tend to be in more distress before abortion rather
than after it, and that women have a low rate of negative reactions to
abortion.349  The evidence that limiting or eliminating women’s abor-
tion rights will leave women better off is questionable at best.
Critics of race-based affirmative action have failed to assemble
systematic evidence supporting their claims that affirmative action
leaves people of color worse off.350  Some people of color have
345 See supra text accompanying notes 169–71.
346 See supra text accompanying notes 246–55.
347 See supra text accompanying notes 256–69, 299–302, 308–17, 321–33.
348 See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
349 See supra notes 67–68 and accompanying text.
350 See supra text accompanying note 141.  Richard Sander recently noted the dearth of
evidence supporting claims that affirmative action leaves people of color worse off. See
Richard H. Sander, A Systemic Analysis of Affirmative Action in American Law Schools,
57 STAN. L. REV. 367, 368 (2004) (“[T]here has never been a comprehensive attempt to
assess the relative costs and benefits of racial preferences in any field of higher educa-
tion.”).  Sander attempted to fill this gap with a study that purportedly demonstrated that
“blacks are the victims of law school programs of affirmative action, not the beneficiaries.
The programs set blacks up for failure in school, aggravate attrition rates, turn the bar
exam into a major hurdle, disadvantage most blacks in the job market, and depress the
overall production of black lawyers.” Id. at 481.  However, many scholars have uncovered
flaws in Sander’s methodology and disputed his conclusions. See, e.g., Ian Ayres &
Richard Brooks, Does Affirmative Action Reduce the Number of Black Lawyers?, 57 STAN.
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opposed race-based affirmative action programs on the ground that
L. REV. 1807, 1809 (2005) (“[T]his response refutes the claim that affirmative action has
reduced the number of black lawyers.  We find no persuasive evidence that current levels
of affirmative action have reduced the probability that black law students will become
lawyers.  We estimate that the elimination of affirmative action would reduce the number
of lawyers.”); Katherine Y. Barnes, Is Affirmative Action Responsible for the Achievement
Gap Between Black and White Law Students?, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1759, 1800 (2007) (“The
results presented here are not definitive because they suffer from the same data limitations
as the studies of Sander and his critics, but they provide strong evidence that affirmative
action has significant benefits and that the evidence of negative consequences Sander pro-
vides is highly suspect.”); David L. Chambers et al., The Real Impact of Eliminating
Affirmative Action in American Law Schools:  An Empirical Critique of Richard Sander’s
Study, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1855, 1898 (2005) (“His conclusions are simple, neat, and wrong.
As we have demonstrated here, they rest on a seriously flawed appraisal of the current
evidence.  We believe that, using the same evidence, we have demonstrated just the oppo-
site:  that, without affirmative action, both the enrollment of African American law stu-
dents (particularly at the fifty or eighty most selective schools) and the production of
African American lawyers would significantly decline.”); Michele Landis Dauber, The Big
Muddy, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1899, 1903 (2005) (“He concludes that blacks would obtain
better and higher-paying jobs if not for affirmative action.  In what follows, I show that
Sander has no evidence whatever for this finding due to elementary methodological errors
in his modeling of the labor market.”); Beverly I. Moran, The Case for Black Inferiority?
What Must Be True If Professor Sander Is Right:  A Response to A Systemic Analysis of
Affirmative Action in American Law Schools, 5 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 41, 58 (2005) (“Pro-
fessor Sander’s arguments fail on their methodology, their logic, and their real-world appli-
cation.”); Jesse Rothstein & Albert H. Yoon, Affirmative Action in Law School
Admissions:  What Do Racial Preferences Do?, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 649, 712 (2008) (“There
is no plausible interpretation of the data under which the elimination of affirmative action
would increase the number of black lawyers, or even decrease it by a small amount.
Rather, a shift to race-blind admissions would have reduced the number of blacks from the
cohort studied here who became lawyers by over 50 percent.” (footnotes omitted)); David
B. Wilkins, A Systematic Response to Systemic Disadvantage:  A Response to Sander, 57
STAN. L. REV. 1915, 1960–61 (2005) (“Affirmative action in law school admissions has
played a crucial role in transforming a once exclusionary and insular profession into one
that is at least tolerably diverse.  Notwithstanding the difficulties Sander documents, the
black lawyers who have been at the forefront of this transformation have for the most part
done remarkably well . . . . Any claim that most, or even a significant percentage, of these
integration warriors would have been better off under a regime where law schools treated
Bakke as an indication that affirmative efforts were no longer necessary or desirable is
simply not supported by the evidence.”); Daniel E. Ho, Scholarship Comment, Why
Affirmative Action Does Not Cause Black Students To Fail the Bar, 114 YALE L.J. 1997,
1997 (2005) (“[T]he article misapplies basic principles of causal inference, which enjoy vir-
tually universal acceptance in the scientific community.  As a result, the study draws inter-
nally inconsistent and empirically invalid conclusions about the effects of affirmative
action.  Correcting the assumptions and testing the hypothesis directly shows that for simi-
larly qualified black students, attending a higher-tier law school has no detectable effect on
bar passage rates.” (footnote omitted)). See also WILLIAM G. BOWEN & DEREK BOK, THE
SHAPE OF THE RIVER:  LONG-TERM CONSEQUENCES OF CONSIDERING RACE IN COLLEGE
AND UNIVERSITY ADMISSIONS 276 (1998) (“On inspection, many of the arguments against
considering race in admissions—such as allegations of unintended harm to the intended
beneficiaries and enhanced racial tensions on campus—seem to us to lack substance.  More
generally, our data show that the overall record of accomplishment by black students after
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they harm their supposed beneficiaries,351 but the overall number of
people of color who claim that affirmative action has left them worse
off remains small.  The Supreme Court, in turn, has emphatically
insisted that affirmative action injures people of color, but it has not
been able to cite any person of color who actually challenged any of
the programs that the Court reviewed.352  White individuals or white-
owned businesses brought the lawsuits the Court decided, and the
plaintiffs’ essential claim was that affirmative action programs unfairly
advantaged, rather than harmed, people of color.353
There is even less evidence that protection from marital rape
injures women.  I have been unable to locate any evidence that
women in states that fully criminalize marital rape regret pursuing
marital rape prosecutions rather than reconciling with their husbands
or believe that they would be better off without the full protection of
the criminal law from marital rape.  There is also no available evi-
dence that women in states that retain some form of a marital rape
exemption are more likely to stay with their husbands after marital
rape or to be satisfied with their marriages.
The third criteria for evaluating mutual benefits arguments asks
whether claims that women or people of color will be better off
without a right or opportunity turn on narrow, historically embedded
assumptions about how group members should think, act, and live.
graduation has been impressive.”); Richard O. Lempert et al., Michigan’s Minority Gradu-
ates in Practice:  The River Runs Through Law School, 25 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 395,
496–97 (2000) (“Perhaps the core finding of our study is that Michigan’s minority alumni
. . . appear highly successful—fully as successful as Michigan’s white alumni—when success
is measured by self-reported career satisfaction or contributions to the community.  Con-
trolling for gender and career length, they are also as successful when success is measured
by income.”).
351 See supra notes 121, 133–34, 141–48 and accompanying text.
352 See supra text accompanying notes 127, 134.
353 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 316–17 (2003); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 204–06 (1995); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,
481–83 (1989); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 272–73 (1986) (plurality
opinion); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 276–78 (1978) (opinion of
Powell, J.). Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, 551
U.S. 701 (2007), did not directly identify any plaintiff’s race. See id. at 728 (plurality
opinion) (“Joshua McDonald’s requested transfer was denied because his race was listed as
‘other’ rather than black . . . .”).  For more information about the Parents Involved plain-
tiffs, see Thomas C. Tobin, Court Axes Efforts at Desegregation, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES,
June 29, 2007, at 1A (“In 2002, Crystal Meredith’s 5-year-old son, Joshua McDonald, was
denied a transfer to another school because he is white. . . . White students [in Seattle]
were shut out of a newly rebuilt high school in their area when nonwhite students were
admitted as part of the district’s racial balancing plan.  Some white families did not get any
of their other top choices in the city’s ‘open choice’ program.  A group called Parents
Involved in Community Schools was formed to challenge the School Board.  It sued in July
2000.”).
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As we have seen, arguments that women benefited from common law
coverture and women-only protective labor laws were grounded on
the premise that women’s ultimate responsibilities and preeminent
roles were domestic.  Courts, legislatures, and commentators knew
that coverture and women-only protective labor laws helped women
precisely because these legal regimes kept women closely tied to their
homes and families—where they belonged and could thrive—and con-
strained in their ability to participate in the market or other aspects of
public life—where women’s involvement would be disastrous for eve-
ryone, including women themselves.354  Arguments that African
Americans benefited from slavery and racial segregation rested on the
assumptions that African Americans were innately suited for
subordinate societal roles and better off the fewer claims and
demands they made on white people and white-dominated institu-
tions.355  None of these arguments inquired into what individual
women or African Americans thought, believed, or wanted, or
allowed for the possibility of variance within those groups.  Instead,
these arguments assumed that women and African Americans should
think, act, and live in ways compatible with existing social structures
placing men over women, and whites over blacks, and strove to
enforce those assumptions by denying rights and opportunities that
might have permitted some women or people of color to deviate from
dominant expectations.
Contemporary proponents of marital rape exemptions or
antiabortion laws do not endorse common law coverture or laws con-
straining women’s rights to negotiate about market work.  But the
argument that marital rape exemptions protect women is focused on
keeping women within marriage and confident that women’s welfare
is maximized there, even after marital rape.  This argument contends
that women whose husbands have raped them are better off without
the right to pursue prosecution because then they will not be able to
take steps that would ruin their marital privacy, end their marital har-
mony, and make marital reconciliation much less likely.356  The argu-
ment that limiting or eliminating abortion rights protects women
assumes yet more explicitly that women’s greatest responsibilities,
true interests, and ultimate satisfactions are domestic.  Indeed,
antiabortion advocates asserting that abortion harms virtually all, or
all, women explicitly rest their case on the propositions that women
354 See supra text accompanying notes 166–68, 194–200.
355 See supra Part IV.
356 See supra text accompanying notes 26–36.
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are naturally maternal and that abortion is therefore an unnatural,
psychologically damaging act by definition.357
Modern critics of affirmative action emphatically repudiate both
slavery and racial segregation.  Indeed, almost all contemporary
Americans, inside the legal system and out, would reject the notion
that slavery and segregation benefited blacks along with whites.  They
would similarly condemn proslavery and segregationist arguments
that blacks were intellectually inferior and innately suited for
subordinate societal roles.
But the defenses of slavery and segregation also rested on the
premise that racial harmony benefiting all races was best accom-
plished when African Americans accommodated themselves to
whites, rather than when the accommodation ran in the other direc-
tion or both directions at once.  Proslavery advocates argued that the
way to maintain racial peace was to keep blacks in bondage and
thereby avoid the ferocious racial conflict that emancipation would
assertedly create.358  These advocates did not consider the possibility
that abolishing slavery might reduce racial tensions between whites
and blacks by ending a tremendous source of racial injustice.  Segrega-
tionists similarly warned of the racial antagonism, hostility, and vio-
lence that would follow integration, and maintained that blacks should
accordingly accept segregation.359  Jim Crow’s supporters did not
express concern about the racial conflict and tension that the inequali-
ties of segregation created or suggest that whites should mitigate this
tension by responding to the needs and demands of African
Americans.
There are echoes of this asymmetry in the Supreme Court’s con-
tention that race-based affirmative action programs should be limited
or eliminated because otherwise they might lead to racial hostility.360
The contention seems to assume that the racial inequalities that
affirmative action programs are meant to redress have not already
created racial hostility.  Instead, what might generate racial hostility
are programs designed to help people of color at the potential expense
of whites.  And the best way to promote racial harmony is to eliminate
affirmative action programs, although maintaining these programs
could reduce inequalities between whites and people of color.  Here
again, the claim is that people of color will advance their own interests
if they abandon important demands they have made on white-
dominated institutions.
357 See supra text accompanying notes 56–58, 72–73, 102–03.
358 See supra text accompanying notes 249–55.
359 See supra Part IV.B.
360 See supra text accompanying notes 128, 155.
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The fourth criteria for evaluating arguments that women or
people of color are better off without a right or opportunity asks
whether the arguments acknowledge any possible benefits associated
with the right or opportunity and any possible costs associated with
denying it.  Mutual benefits discourse is less plausible if it has no
engagement with counterarguments and no account of why a rational
person might seek the right or opportunity in question.  For instance,
defenders of common law coverture, slavery, and racial segregation
had no real explanation for why women or African Americans would
challenge those regimes, except to maintain that the people who did
so misconstrued their own best interests.361
Contemporary judges, legislators, and commentators advancing
mutual benefits arguments in support of marital rape exemptions,
antiabortion laws, or restrictions on race-based affirmative action also
routinely fail to acknowledge that their positions impose any costs or
that the denied rights and opportunities would confer any advantages.
Modern defenders of marital rape exemptions typically limit them-
selves to arguments about how criminalizing marital rape supposedly
harms women, along with their husbands and society as a whole.362
Exemption supporters do not concede that marital rape or marital
rape exemptions might cause women any injury, although the tremen-
dous harm that marital rape inflicts is well-documented.363  Their only
explanations for why women would seek their husbands’ prosecution
for marital rape contend that such women either misunderstand their
own interests or have illegitimate interests in vindictively pursuing
false charges.364
Antiabortion advocates, in turn, focus on detailing the injuries
that abortion assertedly inflicts on women.365  They do not discuss the
harms that women would experience if their access to legal abortion
were reduced or eliminated, or even acknowledge that a woman
unable to secure a legal abortion has experienced an injury.  Yet
criminalizing abortion would do nothing to address the conditions and
circumstances that lead women to seek abortions and nothing to help
women perform the work associated with motherhood.
Similarly, critics of affirmative action repeatedly emphasize the
injuries that affirmative action programs purportedly inflict on people
of color.  These critics routinely fail to explain why many people of
color support and participate in affirmative action programs, to dis-
361 See supra Parts III.A, IV.
362 See supra text accompanying notes 26–44.
363 See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
364 See supra text accompanying notes 26–44.
365 See supra text accompanying notes 50–60, 70–79.
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cuss the harms and inequities that motivated the establishment of
affirmative action, or to consider the injuries and injustices that
people of color might experience without affirmative action.366
As we have seen, mutual benefits arguments tend to have a pat-
tern of common flaws.  Contemporary claims that women are pro-
tected when marital rape is legalized and abortion rights are narrowed
or abolished, or that people of color are protected when race-based
affirmative action programs are restricted or eliminated, abundantly
display the recurring weaknesses of mutual benefits discourse.
CONCLUSION
Mutual benefits arguments for restricting the rights and opportu-
nities open to women and people of color remain potent and popular,
transcending substantive categories to link apparently disparate
debates that are rarely considered together.  These arguments are
already prominent in contests over race-based affirmative action,
antiabortion laws, and marital rape exemptions, and they are likely to
pervade even more disputes over time.  Mutual benefits claims have
long flourished in periods when reform movements targeting sex and
race inequality helped undermine contentions that the law should
simply disfavor women and people of color.
The historical role that mutual benefits discourse assumed in
defending pernicious sex and race discrimination creates grounds for
caution in considering contemporary mutual benefits claims.  The long
tradition and cultural resonance of mutual benefits arguments may
give these arguments an outsized power to persuade with too little
elaboration, examination, investigation, or deliberation.  Mutual bene-
fits claims track deep-seated ways of thinking about women and
people of color, and build on entrenched justifications for limiting
their rights and opportunities.  But historical mutual benefits argu-
ments presumed that women and people of color were especially poor
decisionmakers unable to act in their own best interests, demanding
that women prioritize domesticity above anything else and that people
of color accommodate themselves to whites and accept subordinate
societal roles.  Contentions that women and people of color benefit
from restricted rights and opportunities have historically operated to
rationalize, perpetuate, and enforce legalized discriminations that are
now widely condemned, including slavery, racial segregation, and
women’s legalized inequality.
Legal authorities and advocates can use the reasons why histor-
ical versions of mutual benefits discourse are unconvincing to assess
366 See supra text accompanying notes 121–55.
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modern claims that all parties are better off when the law limits the
rights and opportunities available to women and people of color.
Judges, legislators, and commentators need to evaluate contemporary
mutual benefits arguments carefully or they will risk reinforcing some
of America’s oldest and most persistent status inequalities.
